LINKING COMPLEX EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND TRANSITION INITIATIVE

 

 

 

 

 

Human Security in Angola:

A Retrospective Study

 

 

Elizabeth Stites, M.A., M.A.L.D.

Jennifer Leaning, M.D., S.M.H.

 

December 2002

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Prepared for USAID (Africa Bureau)/Tulane CERTI

 

Harvard School of Public Health

 

Program on Humanitarian Crises

François Xavier-Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 

Executive Summary                                                                                                     3

Part I: Human Security in Angola                                                                               5

Part II: Home                                                                                                             16

Part III: Community                                                                                                  25

Part IV: Future                                                                                                           39

Endnotes                                                                                                                     48

Bibliography                                                                                                               56

 

 

Executive Summary

 

1. This case study uses the analytical lens of human security to conduct a retrospective analysis of the conflict and humanitarian crisis of the last ten years (1991-2001) in Angola. This study develops a set of indicators to measure rising instability that might be effective for predicting conflict or crises in other settings. The close analysis of the situation in Angola also illustrates how an ex antehuman security assessment might have improved the international community’s interpretation and possible response to the shifting conditions on the ground over the last decade of civil war.

 

2. Authors Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie developed the human security framework as part of a USAID/CERTI (Complex Emergency Response Transition Initiative) project through the Harvard School of Public Health and Tulane University’s School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. The human security model seeks to shift the focus of international assistance to the individual, household, and community. This model posits that human security at the local level is essential to create a base of stability and resilience capable of sustaining human and economic development over the long term.

 

3. Human security is broadly defined as the individual or collective capacity to function productively and contribute to society. The basic needs of food, water, shelter, and safety are fundamental, but these requirements for survival must be supplemented by the psychosocial inputs of identity, recognition, participation, and autonomy. These psychosocial needs reflect individual and collective connections to self, others, and a sense of time. For assessment purposes, these needs are categorized as positive attachments to three domains: home, community, and the future. When connections to these domains are strong, resilience to external shock is increased, vulnerability mitigated, and the proclivity for conflict, crisis, and collapse decreases. To ensure more effective design and implementation of development programs, an assessment of an individual’s or a community’s hope for the future – the over-arching determinant of human security – will be critical.

 

4. Implementing the human security framework requires tracking and evaluating a series of indicators to monitor dynamic change on the ground over time. Evaluation of the indicators will capture trends and shifts that may presage periods of peace, conflict, or collapse. Close monitoring of the local level indices will improve both the predictive and interpretive capabilities of national and international agencies, and will assist organizations to develop timely and effective interventions to shore-up areas of potential instability. Identifying appropriate local level indicators entails broadening the scope and nature of information sources and thinking outside of the usual parameters of the development approach.

 

5. Human security as a positive attribute is difficult to measure, and is often more apparent in situations where it is lacking. Vulnerability is more easily recognizable than resilience, and the most effective measures of human security are negative indicators reflecting points of weakness or instability. For instance, rates of displacement are more readily available than information on people’s ties to their homes, and destructive tension between groups is more apparent than community cohesion. For these reasons, the framework calls for special attention to be paid to inverse indicators of human security.

 

6. This in-depth case study was compiled through an extensive literature review and analysis of the data of international organizations and United Nations agencies. This approach illustrates a highly effective manner of identifying possible indicators of human security, but also proves our initial hypothesis: an exhaustive retrospective analysis is not necessary for the development of appropriate indicators. While the case study brought to light many fascinating factors that have affected human security over the last decade in Angola, the majority of the most relevant trends and aspects could have been identified rapidly, assuming that agencies or individuals knew what to look for. This report seeks to provide examples of generic but viable indicators that are applicable to a variety of situations.

 

7. HOME:  The psychosocial domain of home focuses on individual and collective relationships to location. Positive attachments to home should provide safety, identity, recognition, and freedom from fear. Factors affecting attachment to home in Angola over the last decade include displacement, urbanization, desertion, forced immobility, and the desire to return home. The years of war in Angola have brought extremely high rates of internal and cross-border displacement, and some households have moved numerous times. Extended sieges of the cities in the central highlands resulted in long periods of forced immobility for many residents, negating the characteristic of home as a place of safety.

 

8. COMMUNITY: Analysis within the domain of community seeks to understand the nature of social and kinship ties. Ideally, these networks are sources of participation, resilience, and support for their members, but, as evident in many war-torn societies, the positive aspects of these networks can easily erode and decay. Events in Angola illustrate the negative effects of conflict, violence, and pervasive poverty on community cohesion. The broad categories influencing individual and collective attachments to community in Angola include social networks, inequality, authority structures, health, violence, conscription patterns, and crime.

 

9. THE FUTURE: Individual and collective sense of the future is the most difficult domain to quantify within the human security framework. Few reports or primary informant interviews contain direct references to hope or despair. Proxy indicators that relate to planning (or lack of planning) for the future are often the most effective indicators within this domain. Planting a harvest, for instance, signifies a planning horizon of at least one season. The savings rate of a given household or community is also a good indication of impressions of the future. Many complex factors influence individual and communal optimism or despair, but we found the following indicators to be the most relevant to our assessment of a sense of the future in Angola: food security, expressed or implied hope, coping strategies, participation in civil society, and birth and fertility rates.

Part I: Human Security in Angola

Introduction

A shifting focus

 

In recent years the discourse surrounding international development has begun to shift from the level of the state to the level of the household and community. Donors conceive of “beneficiaries” as families, households, or community groups, and many implementing partners now place greater emphasis on understanding local needs and priorities. Communities are increasingly expected to participate in development efforts and to assume responsibility for project sustainability. Macroeconomic development and national capacity building have not been swept by the wayside, but there exists an increased awareness of the benefits of community-based programs and the involvement of local populations.

 

Although field observations and evaluations are the best means of obtaining a clear picture of local needs and priorities, funding and programming decisions are usually made far from the beneficiary communities. As a result, the final “yea” or “nay” decision falls to individuals who manage multiple portfolios, have little time for extensive field visits, and face a range of competing political and budgetary constraints. 

 

The human security framework developed by authors Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie in 2000 seeks to recognize and respond to this disconnect between the field practitioner and the donor office.[1] The framework suggests assessment mechanisms that can be applied from a distance yet focus on local changes and developments and recommends a set of indicators to measure the psychosocial well-being of communities. These indicators track sudden shifts and dynamic changes at the local level, but rely on information that can be gathered through a range of channels, contacts, and sources.

Non-Governmental Organizations: The essential link

 

National and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continue to be the most important link between donors and communities. The onus remains on these organizations to conduct thorough and accurate assessments of need, to prioritize their findings, and to present compelling but reasoned projects and proposals to donors. To assist in this end, the human security framework seeks to develop a set of practical tools for use on the ground. As discussed in detail in this case study, the most important assessment mechanism is attention to local changes, such as those in mortality and morbidity, nutritional status, mobility, violent injuries, food security, and relative equality or social status. 

 

The key consideration of any implementing partner or donor should be: “Will this project achieve the desired result, and will that result make a positive impact on the lives of individuals, households, and communities?” Consequently, this case study stresses the importance of understanding how people relate to their homes and communities, how they view their future, and how these views are likely to affect the success or failure of projects or initiatives. Many well-conceived programs have failed due to a lack of readiness, absence of stability, or misunderstanding of community will and priorities. Sudden shifts in stability may be difficult to predict in advance, but attitudes and priorities at the individual and community level should be discernable through the use of contextually appropriate assessments tools, well-trained field workers, and astute analysis of collected data.  

 

The Human Security Framework

A prerequisite for human development

 

In line with the international discussion on human security, the Leaning/Arie model calls for a shift away from the state and towards individuals and communities in monitoring situations and in designing development programs. According to the model, a high degree of human security is critical for sustainable development, and should be ensured prior to the implementation of larger social, political, and economic programs.

 

If human security is a prerequisite for the long-term success of development programs, then national and international organizations should incorporate strategies to bolster human security into their projects. The outstanding issue, however, is how best to gauge the existing level of human security in a given society. Standard measures of development, such as life expectancy, literacy rates, and per capita GDP, are relevant in terms of a country’s overall international status, and can be relatively simple to measure and compile. These indices, however, can act as leveling devices that mask disparities among population groups, regions, and over time. Such measures also fail to take into account many of the conditions or experiences of a society’s most vulnerable members and do not register important changes that may occur under conditions of extreme insecurity, such as conflict or natural disaster.

 

Although no composite index will be able to take into account the experiences of every demographic group, the human security model seeks to identify indicators that will better reflect the stability or vulnerability of a broader range of communities. The specific indicators will differ based on context, culture, and community. At the same time, some measures of human security resonate across societies and regions.

 

Basic and psychosocial needs

 

Two key components make up the criteria required to achieve a base level of human security. First, people must be able to secure the basic needs of food, water, shelter and safety in order to have protection from or resilience to external threats. Second, the ability must exist to support the psychosocial needs of identity, recognition, participation, and autonomy.[2] Leaning and Arie argue that resilience is not based on material assets, but on a core bundle of material, social, and psychological resources.[3] This bundle dictates the terms of human survival and quality of life: a complete and durable collection of resources promotes human development, whereas a weak or incomplete bundle leaves people unable to withstand social, political, or economic shocks. The potential for conflict, crisis, or humanitarian collapse is partially determined by the quality of these individual and collective capabilities. Upheaval is more likely in societies where a large number of people lack basic and psychosocial necessities and are therefore chronically vulnerable to external shocks.[4]

 

The Leaning/Arie model assesses the psychosocial components of human security that appear to be common in all cultures and contexts. The authors break these components into three aspects of human existence: attachments to home (or location), sense of community, and impressions of the future. Analyzing psychosocial indicators under these categories will allow for an integrated interpretation of overall resilience or instability.

 

Three domains of human security

 

·         Home:                         a sustainable sense of location

·         Community:                 a network of constructive social or family support

·         Future:                         a positive sense of the future and acceptance of the past

 

The Leaning/Arie human security framework focuses on the strength of attachment to home, community, and the future. These linkages influence levels of human security: resilience is greater with stronger attachments to these three elements, and recovery from shock is difficult when connections are weak or damaged. Violence, displacement, discrimination and severe poverty erode linkages, forcing individuals to look to other, and possibly less constructive, sources for support, survival, and collective identity. These potentially destructive alternative sources can in turn contribute to social decay or disintegration.

 

Quantifying individual and collective attachment to home, community, and the future is often most feasible in the negative or inverse. Dislocation from home is more apparent than attachment; lack of leadership structures or high inequality are often more visible than community cohesion; high-risk behavior and reluctance to engage in long-term projects are more easily observed than careful planning for the future. Human security assessments therefore make use of negative indicators, designed to capture and measure levels of detachment, destruction, and pessimism. Changes in behavior and social patterns, either sudden alterations or shifts over time, can also signal shifts in levels of human security. In theory, a comprehensive analysis of inverse indicators flagged by dynamic change will serve as a threat assessment mechanism to predict the likelihood of conflict or retrospectively to examine the factors that contribute to crises. 

 

Home

 

The first psychosocial domain, sense of home or attachment to place, seeks to measure individual and collective relationships to a location. To be a source of stability, such a relationship must be sustainable and offer a sense of identity and freedom from fear. In assessing attachment to place, the human security model seeks to understand how dislocation from home influences individual and collective identity, recognition, participation and autonomy. Dislocation has a range of possible causes, including government policy, economic need, natural disasters, environmental degradation, and conflict. Forced displacement in the context of conflict is extremely devastating, as it often accompanies violence and the destruction of social networks.[5] Rates of impoverishment, malnutrition, and morbidity usually rise in situations of large-scale dislocation, and self-sufficiency, an important indicator of social and physical well-being, decreases.[6]  Due to these trends, the rate or extent of dislocation from home can be a critical measure of societal breakdown, reflecting the human toll brought by conflict, poverty or policy.

 

Community

 

The second psychosocial domain of human security is sense of community. The human security approach seeks to monitor factors that disrupt communities and the repercussions of these upheavals. The differing degrees of resilience and vulnerability among communities will also determine the extent of damage to the social order. In some instances, adverse situations (such as the siege of a town or city) may actually contribute to cohesion as communities draw together for survival. Other conditions, such as famine, may necessitate increased individualism and push people farther apart. Cohesion may break down due to sudden social or political changes, economic turmoil, ecological marginalization, or rising inequality. Influential leaders seeking to mobilize ethnic or national differences exacerbate tensions and fuel conflict. Regardless of the underlying factors, community disruption results in the disintegration of social networks and the fragmentation of collective identity. If we assume that a cohesive community is less prone to upheaval, then monitoring community decay may prove useful in predicting or understanding conflict or crisis.[7] 

 

Sense of the future

 

The final domain of the human security framework is individual or collective sense of the future. In order to have stability in terms of home and community, there needs to be a sense of continuity and predictability of these factors over time. Individuals or groups must consider their investments, capacities, and assets to be durable and protected. People often link their perceptions of the future to their impressions of the past: a strong historical attachment can provide cohesion under stress, but might also act as the vehicle for the perpetuation of grievance and conflict. Present conditions also have a strong bearing on people’s sense of their future, with deprivation, poverty, and protracted conflict unlikely to contribute to optimism.

 

A sense of the future is the most difficult of the human security indicators to measure. Political economist Peter Uvin believes that optimism or despair can be important reflections of how people view their situation. In his two and half years of research on Rwanda, however, Uvin found only two studies or interviews that directly mentioned the future.[8] In their work on human security, Leaning and Arie employ the concept of a “discount rate” to assess the interplay of behavior patterns and impressions of the future. In economic terms, the discount rate indicates how much of potential future assets people are willing to mortgage today. Engaging in risky behavior implies pessimism, or a high discount rate. Consumption of seed stores is an example of a behavior with a high discount rate, whereas planting crops or urban gardens signifies greater hope for the future.

 

Examining behavior for evidence of the discount rate can provide important information for retrospective analysis, but needs to be augmented by more practical information-gathering tools to be useful for programming purposes. We therefore recommend a more forthright investigation of people’s sense of the future in the initial phases of project planning and design. This will best be done through interviews and surveys of the target population.

Hope: The Over-Arching Determinant

 

A positive or negative sense of the future – essentially dictating an optimistic or pessimistic outlook – is the over-arching determinant of how people live their lives. In the absence of optimism – without hope – people are unable to invest in medium to long-term plans. Geographic, demographic, and economic factors have a strong influence on impressions of the future, as does proximity to conflict, food security, and health status. These factors shape the prevailing sentiments of a given population, which will in turn influence the receptivity to and ultimate success of development programs. A micro-finance project, for instance, requires a willingness among potential participants to make investments to better their future; such a project will not take hold in a climate of risk aversion and fear.

 

In order to design and implement effective and appropriate programs, development organizations and donor agencies need first to have a clear understanding of the impressions, outlooks, and prospects of individuals or communities. Degrees of optimism may vary strongly from one area or group to the next. These variations point to the need to have a rapid but localized method for assessing how people conceive of their current situation and future prospects.

 

Assessing hope

 

We offer several possible survey methods to acquire information regarding a population’s impressions of the future. We recommend that agencies and organizations designing field research select the assessment tool that is most appropriate based on organizational constraints and the characteristics of the target population.Recognizing the limitations of any assessment tool that seeks to gauge material or psychological needs, these should offer a rough evaluation of whether people feel their lives are getting better, worse, or staying the same.

 

The exact assessment mechanisms and specific questions will vary based on context, skills of field workers, and size of the population to be surveyed. For instance, a survey of a displaced population might include inquiries about plans to return home, impressions of safety in various locations, fear of landmines/conscription/return to war, losses of able-bodied family members, plans to transport possessions, and participation in community activities. In contrast, questions posed to a settled community might focus on planting seasons (fields or urban gardening), education of children, plans to have more children, impressions of disaster preparedness or conflict mitigation, food security, predictions for crop, animal, and human health over the coming year, stock-piling of food, and repair to existing housing stock. Perceived willingness to take or grant loans and the extent of savings (of cash, food, or seed) will stand as consistently reliable indicators of impressions of the future.

 

In brief, assessment options could include attitudinal surveys, semi-structured focus groups, or individual interviews. As detailed below, each of these options has its benefits as well as a specific set of limitations, associated costs, margins of error or bias, and potential cultural or contextual problems. [9]

 

§         Attitudinal surveys are designed to solicit perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes and usually follow the format of statement and ranked response. (For instance, a survey question would read, “The professor grades objectively,” and respondents rank the strength of their response from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.) Questions are unambiguous and answers are quantifiable. This method, however, is most effective when self-administered and anonymous, and these benefits become obsolete in populations with high illiteracy rates. Furthermore, the format (definitive statement with an option for refutation) is culturally specific and can be confusing.

 

§         Semi-structured focus groups usually center on a few essential questions. Interviewees are encouraged to expand and explore these issues through discussion. This type of conversational approach may work well in cultures accustomed to public meetings and decision-making through dialogue, but requires a greater time commitment, more intensive training of interviewers, extensive translation, and thorough analysis of results.

 

§         Individual interviews will allow for the greatest detail in the information gathered, but also require the most time, training, and analysis. As a result, the individual interview format is likely to result in smaller overall sample size.

 

The potential reluctance of respondents to discuss their personal lives may be a problem with all of the above methodologies. Respondents who have had prior interaction with development agencies may tailor their answers to attract international assistance. The social status of an individual within the community (as determined by gender, ethnicity, generation, class, or political affiliation) may also affect the nature of the information supplied. Despite the shortcomings and methodological constraints, these rough assessment tools will assist planners and policy makers to acquire a sense of the range of impressions regarding the future of a given demographic group.

 

Using assessment information

 

Results of psychosocial assessments should be used to complement other more traditional assessments, and should be viewed as a sort of “red light” or “green light” for the implementation or continuation of specific projects. Many of the factors contributing to pervasive despair are nearly impossible to address, such as recurring drought or war. Realistic programs aimed at disaster mitigation and local conflict negotiation can seek to alleviate some of the more localized repercussions of these larger negative constants, and such efforts may, over time, assist in building hope at the local level. In a post-conflict setting, for instance, development projects are unlikely to be sustainable if morale and hope are extremely low. In such instances, international agencies may find that projects with more immediate results will be more effective in building human security and stability. This may entail the continuing provision of relief supplies where needed (both food and non-food commodities), the introduction of activities with short-term and easily transferable inputs (eg., restocking of small livestock such as guinea pigs), and work on conflict resolution (in the case of war) or improved resilience, preparedness, and mitigation (for disaster-prone populations).

 

Application to Angola

 

Brief history

 

Angola has been at war since the early 1960s, when uprisings began against the Portuguese colonial government. Lisbon granted independence to the colony in 1975, but civil war between the former liberation movements had resumed by the year’s end. Foreign backing of the two main warring parties remained strong throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with the United States and South Africa backing Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the Soviet Union and Cuba lending support to President Eduardo dos Santos’s MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). Since the early 1990s, there have been two internationally brokered peace accords followed by sustained periods of partial peace. Both these periods contained signs of stability: demobilization campaigns began, imports of weapons decreased, harvests were planted, food security improved, and select roads re-opened. Yet both ceasefires collapsed, bringing a return to all-out war.Angola’s political leaders bear much of the responsibility for the resumption of hostilities in both 1992 and 1998, but the experiences of individuals and communities remain central to understanding and interpreting the conflict. [10]

 

Setting a baseline for the human security model

 

The choice of Angola as a case study for the human security model may seem odd to those who are familiar with the nation’s recent history. There is no possibility of predicting an imminent outbreak of conflict, as the country has been at war almost continuously for forty years. Years of colonialism, conflict, disease, pillage, and lack of investment have left the countryside ravaged and the population maimed, uprooted, orphaned, and impoverished. The level of human security in Angola would seem to be easily ascertainable: there is none.

 

We predicted that the extreme conditions in Angola would actually make the country an ideal test case for the human security model. Angola would serve to create a sort of ground zero against which other contexts could be compared. Surprisingly, closer examination of Angola revealed that while the country and populace ranked extremely low on many indicators (such as dislocation, maternal mortality, prevalence of landmines, and recurring food insecurity), there were also pervasive periods of optimism and strong indications of hope, even after more than a quarter century of war. The near-zero ratings on many indicators does, as predicted, allow for the testing of the human security framework and the compilation of indices pointing to the disintegration or improvement in levels of human security. Perhaps more interesting, the unexpected aspects and determinants of hope, community cohesion, and resilience in the country serve to remind us that human security is not a simple or straightforward concept, but rather a complex measure of psychological and social relations, attachments, impressions, and outlooks.

 

Data shortfalls

 

The lack of high-quality quantitative data on Angola also piqued our interest. Would it be possible to conduct a human security assessment given the unavailability of robust data? The decades of upheaval in Angola have resulted in a relative dearth of extensive academic or social science reports on the country, particularly in English. The information flow inside the country is also severely limited due to the destruction of transportation networks, communication systems, and rural/urban links. Until very recently, little was known about conditions in UNITA-held areas that were inaccessible to most national or international agencies for long periods of time. Even now, the presence of landmines and lack of security clearance prevents most members of the NGO community from working in vast areas of the country.[11] Demographic statistics are sparse, as the last official census was conducted under Portuguese rule in 1970 and few modern and reliable sources on socioeconomic conditions exist. Much of the publicly available data is compiled from the surveys and assessments of international NGOs in the more accessible urban areas, primarily Luanda. 

 

A successful human security analysis requires a substantial amount of detailed information regarding local level changes. But few organizations – regardless of the country or context – track such indicators over time in a systematic fashion. Starting from scratch in Angola allowed us to examine the situation from a fresh perspective and to identify ways in which the human security approach could be useful in analyzing even the most difficult country contexts.[12]

 

Indicators must be developed in order to conduct a human security assessment and measure individual and collective attachment to home, community, and the future. Due to the lack of quality primary material on conditions in Angola, however, it was often necessary to rely on generalized or anecdotal information, resulting in a slightly less nuanced picture. In terms of attachment to home, for instance, overall displacement rates within the country at different times are used to provide a general assessment of changing situations. At times we tracked “proxy indicators” to fill in knowledge gaps: in the absence of clear and detail-rich data, alternative measures that link closely to the desired data set are assessed and considered. The proxy indicators used in this case study are those that appeared repeatedly and seemed to correlate closely to the conditions being measured. While the indicators and subsequent conclusions developed here seek to give an overall impression of human security over the past ten years in Angola, the end result will always be open to re-visitation and improvements.

 

Alternatives: A Rapid Approach to Human Security

 

Adopting the human security approach requires the incorporation of a set of indicators into relief and development programs to monitor local level changes in the political, social, and economic realm. Close attention to these changes will enable national and international actors to stay abreast of possible declines or advances in human security in a given geographic area. Gradual trends or abrupt developments will point to areas of possible conflict, humanitarian crises, or public health emergencies.

 

We compiled this case study of human security in Angola through an extensive review of secondary material. Although this has resulted in a comprehensive analysis of the situation, the human security framework does not mandate such an in-depth process. Our research proved that such an endeavor is unnecessary in most cases, and that the essential indicators of human security for a given country can be ascertained much more rapidly and with little expense. In fact, many of the most important factors affecting levels of human security in Angola seem strikingly obvious to anyone familiar with the recent history and prevailing circumstances in the country. Our pre-research hypothesis assumed the following characteristics to be critical to human security in Angola: 

 

·         High rates of displacement and repeated displacement over time eroded individual and collective attachments to home and kinship systems.

·         Systematic and widespread violence against civilians marred the notion of “home” as “safe” and undermined community cohesion. 

·         The country’s extremely low health ranking on indices such as the UNDP Human Development Report signified adverse affects on community well-being and hope for the future.

·         Years of civil war and the repeated collapse of peace efforts were likely to have resulted in extremely low levels of hope for the future.

·         Extreme income inequality and urban/rural disparity adversely affected community cohesion.

·         Extensive state expenditures on the war effort and minimal investments in social services resulted in a poor social contract between the state and its constituents.

·         Food insecurity caused by lack of market access, inability to harvest due to landmines and attacks on civilians, and drought strained coping strategies.

·         Years of inaccessibility to UNITA-held areas resulted in an information gap concerning extensive areas of the country.

 

Rapid information gathering based on country context

 

In order to quickly implement the human security approach, international agencies should identify a dozen generic but viable indicators likely to reflect levels of human security in a given context. Outreach to a range of information sources will rapidly demonstrate the appropriateness of these various measures, and will enable agencies to assign qualitative mechanisms to those that are the most relevant. These indicators can then be incorporated into programs and tested for applicability and effectiveness on the ground. If we had opted to assess our hypothetical indicators for Angola through a “quick and dirty” approach, we would have employed the following methods to gather extensive information in a matter of days:

 

·         Contact the major oil companies in the country to discuss conditions around their installations, concerns regarding the conflict, pay scales for national versus expatriate workers, and the crime rates in various regions.

·         Contact security firms such as Executive Outcomes, the outfit that provided mercenary services to both sides in the 1990s, to discuss the conflict and its repercussions in more remote areas.

·         Seek access to satellite data that might show the areas harvested from one year to the next, the condition of the transportation infrastructure, and population movements.

·         Make contact with UNITA representatives living abroad to discuss the situation in UNITA-held areas.

·         Visit or contact the Angolan embassy for the government perspective on the war.

·         Contact members of the Angolan diaspora who have left the country at various intervals for an insider perspective.

·         Contact academics with expertise in the region. 

·         Contact the country director of Médicins sans Frontières or another organization with extensive health outreach at the local level and a long history in the country to discuss the health situation.

·         Find contact information for key private-sector actors (such as traders, currency runners, arms or diamond smugglers) with access to cell phones and discuss the situation in parts of the country that are inaccessible to international agencies.

·         Contact the various UN special representatives from the last ten years to discuss the collapse of the peace process.

·         Examine the monitoring and distribution reports from WFP to ascertain where relief is going and where it is not. Contact the country director and logistics officer to discuss accessibility.

·         Contact Angolan and international journalists with extensive experience in the country.

·         Visit the websites of African newspapers, watchdog groups, and universities.

·         Seek the most updated reports from the major NGOs working in the country and seek their candid assessments of progress, prospects, and the continuing obstacles.

 

With a few amendments, this list of potential sources of information is applicable to a wide variety of international contexts. Discussions with these contacts would serve to quickly generate a list of the most relevant and quantifiable indicators for the country or context. Mechanisms to track these indicators would then be included in on-going programs and projects, allowing for a “test run” on the relevancy and quality of information gathered through monitoring.

 

Key indicators for various country contexts

 

Many indicators will stand as essential monitors of human security in almost every country. We offer the following list of generic but viable categories of indicators as a starting point for international donors and operational agencies. With several days of investigation and contacts of the nature suggested above, we believe that organizations will be able to narrow this list to the most relevant measures of human security in a given country: 

 

·         Extent of displacement (numbers of IDPs and refugees, living conditions for these groups, relations with host communities)

·         Mortality (crude, maternal, infant, under five years, and adult)

·         Global and severe malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies(by population sector and geographic region)

·         Disease (prevalence and trajectory of infectious diseases, presence of vaccine-preventable diseases, extent of vaccination campaigns, re-emergence of rare or previously eradicated diseases, state funding on prevention mechanisms)

·         Violence within society (regionally and demographically specific, sanctioned by the state or used against the state, violence against civilians, domestic violence, crime rates)

·         Conflict (prevalence and extent of conflict, number and flow of small arms, landmine casualties, role of civilians in conflict, voluntary or forced conscription, use of child soldiers, reintegration of former combatants)

·         Inequality (based on income, race, ethnicity, political or social affiliation, region, access to natural resources, access to social services, access to relief and development resources, and access to political power)

·         Kinship and social networks (intergenerational ties, number of street children, single parent households, migration, remittances, intra-family debt, intra-household access to entitlements)

·         Food security (extent of planting and harvesting, access to markets, availability of goods in markets, fluctuations in market prices, price discrimination based on class, gender, or ethnicity, urban/rural price differentials, intra-household food distribution, effects of relief distributions on prices)

·         Coping strategies (common coping methods in a given area and among a given population, possible erosion of these strategies over time, destructive or constructive effects on physical and psychosocial well-being, demographic factors determining employment of coping mechanisms) 

·         Investment in the future (prevalence of high-risk behavior, planting of crops, savings rates, school enrollment, birth and fertility rates)

 

Summary

 

This preliminary study of Angola has micro and macro implications for the human security model. On the micro level, the case provides a setting for the development of context-specific indicators in the broader domains of home, community, and sense of the future as they have existed in the last ten years of the Angolan conflict.  A close examination of this set of indicators might offer lessons as to how and when the international community could have acted to mitigate vulnerability and perhaps deter the return to conflict. These lessons may in turn offer direction for future interventions or mediation efforts. On the macro level, the research into Angola lays the basic framework and format for the application of the human security model in other contexts. In terms of policy repercussions, the application to Angola highlights the need to expand information observation, analysis, and reporting to the level of local authorities and communities. Furthermore, in order for any sort of early warning mechanism to be effective, the time frame of development and conflict management projects will also need to be expanded.  Such changes may improve the capability of the international community to respond to and/or mitigate conflict, but will only be possible through political will and commitment. The following three sections examine the situation in Angola over the last ten years, and outline a series of indicators applying to the psychosocial domains of home, community, and the future.

Part II: Home

 

An examination of location in Angola through the human security lens substantiates the premise that people are usually better of it they are able to remain at home with their families intact. Nevertheless, the picture is a complex one. People who are prevented from leaving home may experience the lowest human security. Not everyone who is displaced wishes to return home. Conflict does not affect all people in the same manner, as different population groups experience varying levels of human security under the same external conditions.  Close attention must also be paid to the driving forces behind displacement, urbanization, and upheaval to better understand the human security repercussions at the individual and household level.

 

To capture the complexities of home and organize our conclusions regarding human security in Angola, the following indicators were identified: displacement, urbanization, desertion of towns, demographics, forced immobility, and returning home.

 

Displacement[13]

 

 

According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), up to four million Angolans have been uprootedsince 1975, with an estimated 2.86 million internally displaced people, or deslocados, as of March 2001.[15] Both sides in the conflict have long employed strategies of forced dislocation against the civilian population, a clear indication of the tactic’s effectiveness as a weapon of war. In the early 1980s, for instance, the government herded half a million people in the central provinces into protected villages to isolate them from the recruitment drives of UNITA guerillas.[16]  In recent years, UNITA has favored a tactic of driving people into government-held urban areas, thereby decreasing urban stability and heightening the social demands placed on the government. Most of the people psuhed into the urban areas are children and the elderly, as UNITA press-gangs younger adults into military service or retains them in the countryside to work in the fields.[17]

 

The main cause of displacement in Angola seems to be violence or the threat of violence, but other underlying causes, such as food shortages, lack of employment, or better opportunities elsewhere, also contribute to population movements.[18] These distinct causes of displacement indicate different levels of human security. Someone who relocates to seek work, for instance, is likely to have a higher degree of security than one who moves out of fear for his or her life. The number of people that migrate at one time or as one unit also shows variations in human security, with the movement of a large group signifying lower levels of security than the migration of one family.

 

Some theorists, such as Suzanne Jaspars and Helen Young, view migration in the context of complex emergencies as an indication of high distress, a coping mechanism that is invoked only when insurance strategies and more reversible forms of crisis response have failed.[19] Such desperation is evident in an interview given by a displaced Angolan to Médecins Sans Frontières

 

(MSF): “We left because of death and famine….At some point, we had almost nothing left to eat, so we decided to flee through the bush, hoping to be able to reach Kuito.”[20] In the context of Angola, where conflict has affected almost every region, internal or cross-border migration can almost always be linked to high distress and low human security.[21]

 

Effects of displacement

 

Although people migrate in search of better conditions or to escape adversity, research has shown that circumstances usually worsen following dislocation after connections to homesteads neighborhoods and social networks are broken.[22] In Angola, relocation often means sacrificing investments in land and livelihoods, as displaced populations have less access to farm plots, education, and health care than host populations. New migrants to urban areas face discrimination when competing for jobs with more long-standing residents. Housing is usually inadequate in peri-urban areas, and camps for the displaced are poorly serviced. A joint program launched in mid-2000 by the Angolan government and UNHCR found that most IDPs were “living in over-crowded inhumane conditions, without access to food, medical care, water or sanitation.”[23] Furthermore, health care statistics indicate that deslocados are more vulnerable to death and disease than their settled counterparts, largely due to poor sanitation, malnutrition, and limited access to clean water.[24]

 

Correlation between displacement and conflict

 

Research on Angola indicates that displacement tracks closely with periods of escalation in conflict. One example comes from the collapse of the Bicesse Peace Accords and resumption of hostilities in late 1992. Hoping that the peace would last, many people started to return home after the signing of the agreement in May 1991, but the number of displaced rose rapidly with the eruption of fighting sixteen months later.[25] The intensification of violence in the following two years forced an estimated 50,000 refugees to flee to neighboring countries,[26] and a total of 1.3 to 2 million Angolans abandoned their homes.[27] Displacement skyrocketed when the Lusaka Protocol was abandoned again in late 1998, with one million newly displaced between late 1998 and late 2000.[28] The renewal of fighting was most severe in the central highlands, as was the rate of internal displacement in the region in this period.[29]  

 

A cessation of violence, however, may not directly induce people to return home. Endorsement of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994 by the government and rebels seemed to signal another chance at peace, but people were cautious about returning after the failure of the Bicesse agreement. UNHCR misjudged this apprehension, and launched an appeal to fund a repatriation and reintegration operation aimed at assisting 311,000 refugees predicted to return to Angola. Delays in the implementation of the accords, continuing instability, and the presence of millions of un-mapped landmines contributed to insecurity, resulting in a much lower rate of spontaneous repatriation.[30]

 

Migration as early warning

 

Migration is often an important sign of impending conflict. Fear and rising insecurity drives people from their homes, and tracking migration patterns will help indicate impending conflict. Whereas rural residents and the poor have few options but to pack up and leave, wealthier urban dwellers generate a slightly different set of migration-related indicators. For instance, a sudden rise in visa and passport applications signals insecurity among the better off, as does evidence of preparation for the flight of capital (transfers to off-shore accounts, exports of expensive household goods, etc). Increased polarization of ethnic groups and growing homogeneity of previously mixed neighborhoods is a sign of growing ethnic strife.

 

Urbanization

 

 

Urbanization as a measure of human security points to discrepancies in stability, security, and resources between urban and rural areas. High urbanization rates in many developing but peaceful countries, however, demonstrate that there is not necessarily a direct correlation between conflict and rural out-migration. Large-scale migration to the cities is common in countries moving from an agriculture-based to a manufacturing-based economy, as rural residents seek better services and employment in urban areas. However, while some Angolans move to the cities in search of economic opportunities, a disproportionately high number of Angolan urban migrants are motivated by a set of “push factors” unique to countries experiencing protracted conflict. These include the direct violence of the war, as well as secondary consequences of the conflict, such as the severing of rural-urban market links, chronic food insecurity, and destruction of transport and communication systems.

 

While no official census has been conducted in Angola in over thirty years and existing demographic information is sparse and often contradictory, evidence points to increased urbanization in the country. People continued to move to the highland towns over the last ten years, even as these cities came under regular fire. Large numbers of people flocked to the relative safety of Luanda, settling in the urban slums (musseques) ringing the capital.[31] The World Bank found that 79% of the Angolan population lived in rural areas in 1980, compared to 67% in 1998.[32] The Angolan government estimated that 15% of the population lived in urban areas in 1970, compared to 40% in 1992. Urbanization was thought to have reached roughly 50% by 1996.[33] Huambo, Angola’s second largest city and located in the volatile highland region, grew from less than 100,000 residents in 1975 to over 1 million in 1990, while a similar rate of growth has been estimated for Lubango in neighboring Huíla Province.[34]  Better infrastructure is not a pull factor, as most towns and cities lack all but the most rudimentary services.

 

Rural to urban migration

 

Urbanization in Angola is largely driven by the low levels of human security in rural areas arising from desperation, conflict, food shortages, and the destruction of social networks. As in many developing countries, however, the influx of people into cities does not bring higher human security, as growing numbers compete for scarce employment, resources, and space to call home. People moving to peri-urban areas may be making conscious choices to exchange one type of insecurity for another. In the context of war, for instance, people may accept increased poverty and disease or be willing to give up social and family networks to move to an area of greater perceived safety. Rising rents in conflict and post-conflict states can serve as a human security indicator, and should be cause for concern due to the possible ramifications on stability and community relations.

 

Desertion

 

 

The phenomenon of the total desertion or sudden abandonment of towns implies extreme distress and massive upheaval. In June of 1999, fieldworkers from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found the first evidence of total desertion in the region when they discovered the towns of Gove, Sambo, and Cuima in the vicinity of Huambo completely abandoned.[35] The Huambo area had been the scene of intense fighting in the 1992-1994 war, and became immersed in conflict again after the 1998 collapse of the Lusaka Protocol. Little was known about the circumstances surrounding the desertion of the towns, or whether the inhabitants returned shortly thereafter. While more information would be helpful, this complete abandonment of towns indicates an extreme loss of hope, a fragile attachment to home in comparison to the need to flee, and a terror or pronounced desperation severe enough to drive entire communities from their villages.

 

It is highly possible that desertions other than those reported around Huambo have occurred but have not been noted by international or national agencies. Local people, including churches, transport drivers, local leaders, and inhabitants of adjacent areas crossed by the fleeing residents would be more likely to be aware of such events. Identifying desertion as a signal of extreme insecurity and conveying the importance of such phenomenon would potentially increase the reporting of such events to relevant authorities. Information sharing between local people and national and international organizations needs to be strengthened and reciprocated in order to rapidly recognize impending or existing social collapse and the potential implications for a wider region.

 

Demography of the Displaced

 

 

While reliable demographic information on Angola is limited, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the war’s effects on family structures and levels of vulnerability. A breakdown of the population by gender and age points to shifting demographic patterns caused by the war. There are 92 men for every 100 women in Angola, but in the 20 to 24 year old bracket there are only 70 men for every 100 women, illustrating the heavy toll the war has taken on young men in particular.[37] Men are also more likely to move to urban centers for economic reasons, whereas women often remain in the rural areas. The rate of male migration combined with high mortality levels for young men has shifted authority within the home, with an estimated 30-35% of family units presently headed by women.[38]

 

 

Men are more likely than women to be killed in active combat, but women and children make up the most vulnerable civilian group. An estimated 80% of the 1.25 million people believed to be internally displaced in 1996 were women and children. This percentage is consistent with international displacement figures, which state that four-fifths of war refugees are women and young girls.[39]Women in rural areas are particularly vulnerable in their positions as cultivators and water collectors, as landmines are common along paths and in fields, and random attacks against villages often occur in outlying areas. The decline in able-bodied men in rural locales and areas with a high concentration of IDPs has further amplified the burden on women as the sole providers for children and the elderly. Refugee or displaced women are often dependent on others for provision of basic necessities, and are therefore highly exploitable while displaced.[40]Jennifer Turpin explains these increased demands in the context of refugee women, but her observations also apply to the internally displaced:

 

Refugee women often serve as their children’s sole caretakers, as many of them are widows or separated from their spouses and other extended family. They must seek food and safety not only for themselves, but also for their children, who also need health care, housing, and an education. Refugee women in exile are often the supporters of an extended family network, playing a central economic role yet still lacking decision-making power in their societies.[41]

 

Women and children are also more likely to suffer disproportionately during the actual process of displacement. This arises from a variety of factors, including higher vulnerability, prevalence of sexual and physical violence, and combatants’ manipulation of population groups seen as weak or expendable. Jodi York describes the conditions experienced by women during and after flight: “Reaching a refugee camp usually requires a woman to sacrifice everything she owns to pay for bribes and avoid repeated rapes, only to arrive in a situation where her physical safety is just as endangered.”[42] When warring factions, hijackers, or hostage takers use human shields they are most likely to use those in low societal positions as the buffer. This was the case in early 1993 when the central Angolan city of Huambo fell to UNITA troops. Government soldiers and a large civilian contingent fled the city, and the women and children were reportedly pushed to the rear of the column to shield the combatants against attack.[43] These examples show that human security is not consistent across society, but is experienced differently in the same situation by different groups based on gender, age, and societal position.[44] 

 

Vulnerability of children

 

Children and providing care to children form a critical part of the psychosocial domain of home.[45] The well-being of children therefore serves as a useful indicator of human security. Certain organizations, such as UNICEF, have already created measurement indices amalgamating variables to rank the status of children in various countries. UNICEF’s index, the Child Risk Measure, found Angolan children to be the most at risk in the world. On an index where a low figure signifies better conditions, Angola received a rank of 96, as compared to the average of 61 for sub-Saharan.[46] Other clear indicators of children’s vulnerability are infant and under-five mortality rates. The UNDP lists the Angola’s 1998 infant mortality rate at 170 out of 1,000 live births, which is second only to Sierra Leone’s rate of 182. Under-five mortality is listed as 292 per 1,000 live births, compared to 316 for Sierra Leone.[47] The high death rate and poor conditions experienced by children indicate low overall human security in the domain of home. While the status of children is only one aspect of the well-being of a family, these readily-available measures prove useful as a starting point from which to build a more thorough analysis.  

 

The war experience of children also sheds light on the level of human security. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS), the Angolan government department in charge of humanitarian operations, more than half the war-affected and displaced are children.[48] A United Nations report from the year 2000 estimated that 100,000 children were separated from their birth families. In a report from the same year, OCHA pointed out that although many of these children had been integrated into alternative family or community structures, many were without care or have only bare minimum needs met.[49] An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 orphans live in the city of central highland city Malanje alone, many of whom lost their mothers to landmine accidents while the adults were looking for food around the besieged city.[50] Benguela and Luanda saw the arrival of roughly 10,000 children between December 1998 and March 1999 due to the heavy fighting in the highland areas.[51] These migrations lead to high numbers of street children, where many are forced to adopt destructive coping mechanisms such as prostitution, crime, or drug use to survive.[52] Others end up as child soldiers, as their exposure and vulnerability makes them easy conscripts. While many children are integrated into alternative care networks, the high number of street children points to the disintegration of much of the larger social and kinship network.

 

Forced Immobility

 

 

While people are generally thought to be in a better position if they maintain ties with their home, this equation is reversed if people are physically prevented from fleeing in times of danger. Combatants have a variety of reasons for limiting the movements of civilians, including the use of the local population for food, conscripts, sexual favors, or camouflage. In many internal conflicts, control of territory and the appearance of supporters are important factors, and opposing forces may wish to keep civilian numbers in their areas high. (In other instances, combatants may prefer to control territory free of inhabitants, and may drive residents out of the area.) Over the last ten years in Angola, UNITA has frequently besieged towns for extended periods, allowing few people to enter or leave. Landmines litter the Angolan countryside, making cultivation, water collection, or travel on unfamiliar roads or paths extremely hazardous.

 

Siege

 

The UNITA sieges of the central highlandcities of Huambo, Cuito, and Malanje offer some of the starkest examples of forced immobility. Cuito remained under siege for 21 months beginning in early 1993, with the total death toll estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 people. Snipers infiltrated the city and took up positions in abandoned buildings on the front line, which ran down one of the town’s main streets for many months. Residents tore holes in the walls between their houses and apartments to connect city blocks and limit the need to venture outside. Trips still had to be made to the river for water, and many of the casualties from sniper fire were therefore women and children.[53] The cemetery was inaccessible for most of the period, and people buried their dead in parks and walkways, or placed them on apartment balconies and covered them with debris.[54]

 

Huambo endured a siege of 55 days in 1993, with an estimated 10,000-15,000 people killed.  More than 1,000 shells fell on the city per day at the height of the attack.[55] The city eventually fell to UNITA, and the government forces and tens of thousands fled the city for the coast. As they vacated, the retreating forces left a blanket of landmines in the suburban areas, ostensibly to hinder a chase by the incoming UNITA troops. Some people managed to escape from the cities in these periods, though chances of being killed while crossing enemy lines were extremely high.  The third major highland city, Malanje, underwent periods of siege and relief for several years, and saw some of the worst mortality rates and conditions in the conflict. In one attack, beginning in January 1999, UNITA forces appeared to be aiming shells at heavily populated market areas. All food supplies were cut off from the city for extended periods.[56]

 

Landmines

 

The prevalence of landmines around villages and towns also increases the insecurity associated with home. Landmines have been a favorite weapon of every armed faction in Angola since the early 1960s, and estimates of total numbers of existing mines range from 7 to 10 million. While this practice may be effective in slowing troop movements, the mining of fields, roads, and paths to water sources affects civilians most severely. Landmines trap people within their homes or villages, making roads inaccessible, fields impossible to cultivate, and daily life fraught with risk. Mine explosions have killed thousands of Angolans, and more than 70,000 people have lost limbs.[57] 

 

Reactions to forced immobility 

 

Measures taken to cope with forced immobility act as indicators of human security. As illustrated from the following examples from siege periods in Malanje, coping measures vary depending on the levels of desperation. Seeking cover or protection is a low-risk response to forced immobility, as was witnessed by a BBC journalist on a visit to a suburb of Malanje during a brief lull in shelling in April 1999:

 

In Rotunda as we walked around people kept popping their heads up from holes they had dug in the ground. People in Rotunda were so used to UNITA’s shelling that they had become like rabbits digging out a rabbit warren to try to protect themselves from the shells.[58]

 

Lying low is only possible for so long, however, and people will eventually engage in high-risk activities in order to meet basic needs or in attempts to flee. Another observer’s description indicates extreme desperation in Malanje at a period in the mid-1990s: 

Every relief flight bringing food and medicine in became an evacuation flight out with desperate people rioting on the airstrip for a place on the cargo plane, or even trying to cling to the wings and wheels as the pilot accelerated down the runway.[59]

 

These reports clearly indicate low levels of human security for people who remained in their homes against their will or in extremely adverse conditions. Physical proximity to home does not necessarily translate into higher human security. 

 

Returning Home

 

 

The desire of individuals, families, or communities to return home following displacement is an important aspect of attachment to place from a human security perspective. It is often assumed that returning to the place of origin is the primary goal of the uprooted. While attachment to home and desire to return can frequently be a motivating objective, this may not be the case in all circumstances. People may have been removed from their home for such a long period of time or to such a distance that return loses relevancy. Younger generations brought up in cities or urban camp environments may have little interest in returning to unfamiliar rural areas. In some instances, the displaced may have found greater opportunities at their new location, or may be unwilling to give up newly established social networks. And often, of course, the home region may simply remain too dangerous or unstable to receive returnees.

 

Desire to return is also closely linked to the circumstances under which people left their original location. Those that left under force or duress, such as the Palestinian refugees, are more likely to define their struggle around the desire to return. Ones who made a conscious choice to resettle elsewhere, even if due to instability in their home region, may be more likely to put down roots in their new location. These considerations lead us to questions of what is home, how is it defined and by whom. The answers of displaced people to these questions will prove central to understanding their levels of human security.

 

Summary

 

Ties to place are closely linked to a positive or negative sense of community and the future. A strong and unified community, made up of social or kinship networks, is likely to increase a sense of belonging to a particular place. In terms of the future, the psychological importance of a given location might decrease if people feel that their situation is destined to worsen; day-to-day survival replaces attachment to home as the variable of primary importance. On the other hand, people may adopt the reverse attitude, giving renewed emphasis to their attachment to home as “all they have left,” or their “only hope.”

If physical attachment to place is determined by location, psychological attachment to place is affected by memories of the past and hope for the future. In many traditional African religions a great emphasis is placed on the location of the graves of the ancestors, and removal from this land can be particularly traumatic.[60] Inter-generational knowledge is also linked to place, and a rupture in families can occur if one generation is removed from the home or land deemed significant by their elders. The severing of ties between generations is already a common facet of life in Angola due to high mortality rates, urbanization, and displacement, and destroying continuity of location further exacerbates this situation.

 

In Angola, conflict is the primary factor determining the ability of an individual or community to maintain attachment to home. The prevalence of violence, likelihood of raids, presence of land mines, or proximity to violence all factor into the decision to flee or stay put.  Armies on both sides use forced displacement and/or forced immobility to manipulate the civilian population. Food insecurity, access to markets, strength of local social networks, and environmental degradation of an area also influence decisions to migrate. While the Angola study provides a useful assessment of home for human security analyses, in other country contexts the exploration of additional indicators may be more feasible.

 

Part III: Community

 

Community cohesion is essential to the healthy operation of a society. Not surprisingly, conflict, humanitarian collapse, and natural disasters usually negatively affect communal relations and human security. There is a great deal, however, still to be learned about impending crises and the nature of community resilience and response. Key components of human security within communities include societal relations, inequality, authority and kinship structures, emergency health indicators, violence against non-combatants, forced conscription and child soldiers, and crime. Obvious overlaps exist with the domains of home and sense of the future: communities are made up of households with a common attachment to a location, and the strength or resilience of a community directly corresponds to how the group views its future.

 

Many of the indicators representing community are most apparent as inverses or negatives; destructive tensions or events within a community, for instance, are often more visible than the strength of community ties. Likewise, sharing between and amongst groups may be difficult to gauge, but degrees of overall inequality are evident in income assessments, delivery of services, and distribution of resources. From the predictive angle, monitoring and evaluation efforts of these indicators can augment an effective early warning system, providing a “temperature reading” of a community’s stability or weakness to assist in the planning of interventions. Conditions at the local level change extremely quickly, making constant and effective monitoring of community indicators essential.

 

Societal Relations

 

 

Humans and their representative communities seek to fill basic psychosocial needs of identity, recognition, participation, and autonomy. These needs are often met through group membership, with the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others.[61] While tension or conflict is not inherent to this model, if and when divisions do open up they are likely to fall along the lines of pre-established group distinctions. Such distinguishing characteristics might include ethnicity, place of origin, class, generation, religion or race. A range of factors, including resource scarcity, political oppression, and the personal or political agenda of community or national leaders exacerbate destructive societal divisions. As Eileen Babbitt points out, strong inter-group or ethnic conflict also causes long-term problems because “it poisons the political and social environment.” The “us versus them” mentality becomes institutionalized and difficult to reverse, either psychologically or politically, posing an added challenge to the rebuilding of communities and the bolstering of human security.[62]

 

Ethnic violence in Angola

 

Ethnic violence has not traditionally played a major role in Angola’s socio-political landscape.[63] As eruptions amidst relative stability, the occasional outbreaks of extreme ethnic violence therefore point even more clearly to community collapse.

 

Angola’s worst bout of ethnic violence in the last ten years followed the first national democratic elections, held in late September 1992. Following his defeat to President dos Santos in the first round, UNITA leader Savimbi declared the electoral results invalid and his forces quickly resumed operations in the provinces. The fighting spread quickly, reaching the usually immune capital within weeks, and violence broke out in the streets of Luanda on October 31^st. The upheaval lasted for three days and left 1,200 people – mostly civilians – dead. The victims were primarily ethnic Ovimbundus or from regions considered to be UNITA strongholds. The violence spread to other cities; house-to-house searches and random executions of unarmed or fleeing civilians were common. Although controversial, the ethnic component of the violence is apparent in the Angolan reference to the period as limpeza, roughly translated as “purging” or “cleansing.”[64] Relative calm returned to most urban areas within several days of the outbreak of fighting, but the violence disrupted communal relationships, undermined existing neighborhood networks, and eroded bonds of trust between neighbors and families.

 

While violent fissures along societal dividing lines have been limited in Angola, the outbreaks following the elections point to a dangerous and destabilizing undercurrent of hostility and tension. The urban context of the killings came as a surprise, as rapid urbanization had resulted in ethnically diverse peri-urban musseques. [65] But the limpeza shows that collective violence in times of threat or fear is likely to occur along pre-existing dividing lines (such as ethnicity), even in mixed neighborhoods. Luanda saw a second outbreak of ethnic violence in late January of 1993, this time aimed at immigrants from Zaire rumored to be supporting Savimbi. The re-emergence of violence a few months later illustrates the pervasive unresolved tensions and the likelihood of repeated flare-ups following an initial outbreak of violence.[66] Tracking such ruptures in the pattern of community relations will help to establish a map or timeline of rises or falls in levels of human security and stability.

 

Elections and violence 

 

A central goal of many donor programs in the developing world is the promotion of democratic norms and institutions. Freely contested elections are the cornerstone of democratic reform, and are seen as the crowning event of democracy and governance programs. The period of mobilization for an election, however, is fraught with potential for upheaval and instability, as numerous examples of election-associated civil unrest, violence, and oppression have shown. Transitional societies are usually extremely vulnerable and have difficulty recovering from calamity or crisis.[67] To decrease the likelihood of upheaval, and ensure that communities have a degree of resilience allowing them to recover from any setbacks, it is imperative that a base level of human security exists before elections are held. Immediate measures to bolster human security, strengthen communities, and introduce incremental local level democratic reforms will help decrease fragility and pave the way for national elections.[68]

 

The high propensity for disruption that accompanies political contests is apparent from the 1992 elections in Angola. After many years of war, the high expectations in the election run-up increased the hope and tension experienced by politicians and ordinary citizens. People were quick to respond when these hopes were dashed, and frustration was vented through violence. From a practical perspective, the chaos in Luanda was most likely exacerbated by the presence of large number of weapons and armed supporters in the capital. However, from a psychological angle, the city had experienced the most intensive psychological and logistical build-up to the elections, and was therefore the most affected by the collapse of the process. In this regard, we see that although a charged atmosphere and elevated expectations may result in a high voter turnout (91% of registered voters par