CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT
Overview
· What is Violent Conflict?
· Causes of Conflict
· Conflict Indicators
· Levels and Phases of Conflict
· Impact of Conflict
Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) deals with collective violent conflict and attempts to assess how vulnerable the particular entity – country, region, state, community – is to violent conflict. It is not easy to forecast violent conflict, and once violence erupts it can be difficult to contain. Thus the challenge of CVA is to detect early signs of potential violent conflict so that effective preventive and remedial measures can be taken. This chapter will briefly discuss the nature, causes, levels, stages, indicators and impact of conflict.
A. WHAT IS VIOLENT CONFLICT?
We define conflict, as “perceived incompatibility of goals or aspirations. Conflict is an inherent part of human existence." Conflict occurs between individuals, groups, and countries – even ones that normally get along famously. It is a normal, even healthy dynamic. A certain amount of conflict can be constructive, inspiring creativity in thought, communication, and action. Even violent revolutionary conflict, viewed from the longer perspective of history, may be a force for progress. The american War of Independence and the Civil War, India’s fight for independence from the British, and the struggle of the South African blacks against apartheid fall into this category.
Collective conflict is generally associated with distinct groups self-identified as such with separate interests, values and aspirations. Collective conflict may be motivated by a desire for constructive change. The violence used by those who fought the apartheid regime in South Africa is arguably defensible. In general, however, there is a widely shared belief that desirable change should be brought about by non-violent means. When conflict catapults into violence, it not only becomes destructive but also may undercut the desired goals of a just peace and sustainable development. Hence regime transitions achieved through violent means are far less likely to achieve these goals than those through non-violent means. .
Violence is normally understood as the use of physical force so as to cause injury or death. However, in conflict analysis it is useful to take a somewhat broader view of violence to include what is called “structural violence” where current institutional structures prevent or inhibit people from satisfying human development needs such as security, acceptance, or effective participation in a just and equitable manner. If people feel thus deprived, as black and other non-white South Africans did under apartheid, it can motivate the victims to resort to direct physical violence in the absence of more peaceful options.
All cultures have developed mechanisms to prevent, mitigate, and punish violent and destructive behavior. Anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom’s (1995) discussion of traditional Mozambican healers developing rituals to “take the violence out of people” so that combatants might be reintegrated into communities is an example of how violent actions are incompatible with traditional community life in that war-torn country.
Under certain circumstances described later in this chapter, collective violent conflict may erupt. At local levels, forms may include blood feuds, vengeance killings, or a communal riot. This kind of conflict may be spontaneous, but is usually organized in some fashion. This is why leadership plays a very important role, even for “mobs.” One of the principal tasks of a vulnerability assessment is to analyze the circumstances of such conflict.
When such conflict is organized and sustained, it may be considered rebellion, insurgency, or war. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 1998 only two of the world’s 26 major armed conflicts were between states (Ethiopia/Eritrea and India/Pakistan). Conflicts in the world today are overwhelmingly intrastate – although international actors continue to play critical roles in many of these internal conflicts.
BOX 1: TYPOLOGY OF VIOLENT CONFLICTSBy Level of Violence· War or High Intensity Conflict - violence characterized by fatality rates averaging >1000/year or extensive (>5%) population dislocation, or both. (Schmid 1998) · Low Intensity Conflict – violence characterized by fatality rates <1,000/year (but >100), and <5% population dislocation. If either threshold is exceeded it is counted as a high-intensity conflict. (Schmid 1998)
By Nature of Conflict · Civil War - armed conflict between groups within the same country where the warring factions each control territory, have a functioning government, identifiable regular armed forces, and the allegiance of a significant portion of the nation’s citizens. · Insurgency – organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (US DOD) · Protracted Social Conflict - ongoing conflict centered on religious, cultural, or ethnic communal identity, which in turn is dependent upon the satisfaction of basic needs such as those for security, communal recognition and distributive justice. (Cited by Schmid 1998) · Revolutionary War – sustained military conflict between insurgents and central governments aimed at displacing the regime. (Esty et al 1995) · War of Secession - violent conflict in which a regionally based ethnic, religious or cultural group attempts to secede from an existing state. (Gurr and Harff 1994) |
There are, of course, different kinds of conflicts (e.g. insurgency, war of secession, civil war, etc.), each with their own dynamics and characteristics. When assessing a country’s risk for conflict, it may be helpful to consider some of the categories of conflict in order to respond most effectively (See Box 1). Note that the typology by nature of conflict does not suggest mutually exclusive categories. Thus, for example, a “protracted social conflict;” “war of secession” and a “war of secession” could well be a “civil war.”
B. CAUSES OF CONFLICT
Socio-political and economic issues have been often held to be at the root of violent conflict.
Similarly, the “basic human needs” approach which dominated development strategies in the 1970s placed economic issues first in the “hierarchy of needs” and therefore most important for achieving development and preventing conflict. Some have argued that racial, ethnic, cultural and religious identity issues could act as independent “primordial” factors that induce conflict or be closely connected to political ideology or can be politicized, particularly when states are weak or economies are stressed. In recent years environmental factors have been increasingly looked at as well -- both in terms of competition over increasingly scarce resources, as well as the deleterious effects that conflict can have on the environment itself.
It is also useful to note that the causes of any given conflict may change over time. As a conflict evolves “new” causes could emerge and the old recede to the background or even fade away. This is particularly true when violence takes a firm grip on the conflict and new actors, both national and international, enter the scene.
It is also important to recognize that many violent conflicts are directly sponsored or incited by national governments. In short the causes of conflict are dynamic and highly complex.
B.1 Social Fragmentation
In ethnic conflict the goals of the contenders and the dynamics of the process varies significantly depending who is in conflict and for what reason. Gurr (2000) identifies several such distinct categories. “ Ethnonationalists” are regionally concentrated groups interested in greater autonomy or independence rather than supremacy over others. The people of Southern Sudan are a classic example of an ethnonationalist group that is fighting for autonomy or independence. In practice, however, autonomy or independence for an ethnonationalist group also may result in supremacy of the victors over other minority groups living in its territory. In such a situation another may replace one form of domination.
“Communal contenders” are groups with a distinct ethnic, cultural or religious identity that vie for supremacy over, or a share in, the institutions of state power. If power is shared successfully sometimes at the center and sometimes through devolution or some combination of both violent conflict can be avoided. Otherwise such violence may not only erupt but also result in wars of secession as has happened in Somalia, Liberia, Sudan and Nigeria in 1967 in the Biafran war of secession.
Two chronically disadvantaged groups are “Ethnoclasses” and “indigenous” groups. Both are culturally distinct groups. Ethnoclasses are ethnically or culturally distinct minorities that have a specialized economic niche in society and form a distinct social strata. In general they are economically and socially disadvantaged. However, some may not be so. For example, the Indian trading community in post-colonial East Africa and the Lebanese community in West Africa have been economically strong. The Tutsi ruling class in Burundi has been politically dominant.
Indigenous groups typically occupy peripheral areas of modern states. The cattle-herding Masai of East Africa are an example.
Some assert that ethno-nationalism motivates “irrational or unreasonable” behavior. This viewpoint however, does not help to gain a proper appreciation of the conflict or potential for conflict. The task of good vulnerability assessment is to understand the culturally relative premises and rationality of the different actors. Ethnic, cultural or religious differences alone are never the sole source of violent group conflict. In contrast ethnic rivalries may be. Such rivalries generate real or perceived incompatibilities in aspirations.
Ethnic conflict is a symptom of other social forces, such as competition over scarce resources, modernization, and state collapse, as well as reflective of the ancient roots of these hostilities. Typically, elements of both are true. Ethnic differences alone are rarely the sole source of communal conflict. It should also be noted that in Africa, some of the most terrible and intractable conflicts have been among those that share great cultural similarities. Somalia is one of the most ethnically homogenous states in Africa. Tutsis and Hutus share the same language, religion, and culture.
Ethnic rivalries are thus often a source of tension, but to understand and address “ethnic conflict,” one must take a balanced approach that is sensitive to many different factors. In many instances, the parties to conflict are driven by perception that may not always accord with the objective reality (structural factors) such as concrete economic conditions or governmental structures. Ethnicity is more of a "mobilization factor" than a cause of conflict per se. It is not the differences that cause conflict, but the politicization of those differences.
B.2 State Failure and Collapse
Predatory, failing or weak states as the major cause of such conflict. A predatory state is one which fails to perform the normal service functions of a state for common benefit but which utilizes state power to exploit the resources of the country largely for a narrow section interest. A failing state is one which is moving towards being dysfunctional in regard to the normal duties of the state. A weak state is one which shows an inability to perform its normal functions over the territory it is supposed to command. That predatory, weak or failing states may be the cause rather than the effect of conflict may be somewhat counterintuitive. The scenario is something like this:
When agents who pursue personal or group rather than public goals capture the state , the stage is set for conflict. (This phenomenon is sometimes called a predatory state.) Those at the helm of government lack legitimacy so must increasingly rely on coercion and an increasingly narrow political base of well-rewarded followers to maintain their position and power. Meanwhile, the organs of the state are diverted towards serving the interests of the few individuals in control economically as well as politically – indeed, one of the characteristics of this kind of rule is the use of the state apparatus for the accumulation of private wealth. |
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Politics becomes an all-or-nothing, zero-sum game rather than an exercise in compromise and consensus building. Performance of the functions of governance serve no purpose to those in control of the state and so wither away; meanwhile, people seek security, education, and other "public goods" through other forms of social organization, such as ethnic groups and NGOs. As the state disintegrates, competing groups become ever more exclusive and are sometimes dominated by “warlords.” Conflict becomes the inevitable outcome if the process continues unchecked.
There is, of course, no easy template formula for state collapse; however, this scenario does follow a common pattern. Box 2 outlines the stages of collapse. One of the most notable features in the process of state collapse is the absence of clear turning points or thresholds.
B.3 Structural Factors
More recently, researchers have been analyzing structural sources of conflict, long-term conditions of a society that are embedded in its social, political, economic, and institutional arrangements. Such factors as poverty, inequality, or economic dependence may not cause conflict in and of themselves, but they create the conditions that make a country ripe for its emergence. From USAID’s policy and program point of view these factors are especially pertinent because it is precisely in such areas that the agency is able to make an effective intervention to avoid or mitigate conflict.
C. CONFLICT INDICATORS
One typology of conflict indicators[4] distinguishes between long-term (general enabling, structural, or pre-disposing) factors and shorter-term (specific dynamic, proximate or situational) factors. Moreover, one can distinguish between conflict accelerators (mobilizing) factors and conflict decelerators (disabling) factors. With these distinctions, we create a 2-by-2 grid of conflict indicators as shown in the figure below, along with examples of each type.
Note: Economic growth is generally helpful to decelerate conflict since it increases the size of the pie that can be shared. But this is not always the case. Economic growth may well destabilize establishes structures and institutions and generate intense competition, breakdown traditional cultural norms and relationships, destabilize society and create conditions for conflict. Major changes in the economic structure, such as that happened in Yugoslavia can be an important accelerator of conflict.
D. LEVELS AND PHASES OF CONFLICT
Figure i.2 (below) shows a simplified model for five levels and five phases of conflict. Levels are defined by the impact of violence (number of deaths, percentage of population involved), while phases occur over time as conflict escalates and diminishes. The nature of violence in conflict situations can take many forms. However, widespread bloodshed may not take place until conflict reaches a fairly mature stage; for this reason, the “early warnings” of violence are often misinterpreted or ignored until it is too late for prevention.
The model shown here is uni-modal, i.e., it has “one hump.” In reality, some conflicts escalate, subside, and again re-escalate; showing a cyclical pattern. The dotted curve indicates the possibility of the rekindling of conflict.
Note that there are two thresholds; the first is a political crisis as the conflict escalates from political tension (level 2) to violent political conflict (level 3). The second threshold is a humanitarian crisis as the conflict escalates from low-intensity conflict (level 4) to high-intensity conflict (level 5).
Figure I.D. LEVELS AND PHASES OF CONFLICT
D.1 Levels of Violence[5]
Level 1: Peaceful Stable Situation – There is a high degree of regime legitimacy. There is no political violence or, at worst, only rarely.
Level 2: Political Tension Situation – There are growing levels of systemic strain and increasing social and political cleavages, often along factional lines. Sporadic violence results in fewer than 50 fatalities from political violence per year.
Level 3: Violent Political Conflict – There is an erosion of political legitimacy of the national government and/or rising acceptance of violent factional politics. Assassinations, terrorist acts, and violent government repression occur, but fatalities from political acts remain below 100 per year.
Level 4: Low-Intensity Conflict – There is open hostility and armed conflict among factional groups, regime repression and insurgency. Fatalities from political are below 1,000 but more than 100 per year and population displacement or dislocation must be below 5% of the total. If either threshold is exceeded it becomes a high-intensity conflict.
Level 5: High-Intensity Conflict – There is +open warfare among rival groups and/or mass destruction and displacement of sectors of the civilian population. Fatalities exceed 1,000 per year and/or population displacement or dislocation exceeds 5% of the total.
D.2 Phases of Conflict
a. Pre-Conflict: The pre-conflict phase represents conditions that are normal to the society concerned. At this stage disputes between groups do not result in violence. If the country has democratic institutions such as a freely-elected legislature with minority representation and a free media, protest will be channeled peacefully through such institutional channels. However, in countries where such democratic institutions do not exist, protest will be more informal and monitoring of dissent more difficult. Ideally, early warning must occur at this stage. Ideally early warning should occur when political tensions emerge within this stage. Development policies should examine structural causes of potential violent conflict and address them. Development strategies should be designed to reinforce mechanisms that channel normal disputes through non-violent means.
b. Conflict Emergence: In this phase disputes become more evident, protesting groups become more vocal and militant, and group interactions become polarized. Protest can take many forms including boycotts, strikes, and mass demonstrations. The degree of violence that such protest entails would depend on the specific conditions that prevail in the country. If the country has a democratic tradition, less violence can be anticipated. If the political conditions are more authoritarian, a higher level of violence can be anticipated. However, in this second phase violence is sporadic and random rather than organized and regular. At this stage, early warnings signal that proactive conflict prevention strategies should be deployed.
c. Conflict and Crisis: In this phase violence intensifies and becomes the principal tool in the conflict for one or more of the parties to the conflict. The level of violence reaches crisis levels. At this stage the state may lose control over some parts of the country. More and more resources are devoted to the conflict, and positions of the warring parties begin to harden.
Chaos and Complex Emergencies: A chaos and complex emergency situation may be reached within this phase when the level of violence passes a threshold that causes state collapse in at least parts of the country where essential institutions such as the police, judiciary, and regular civil administration cease to function. Long-term development initiatives are overwhelmed by short-term needs for humanitarian relief. At this stage of the conflict, interventions typically require the most money and have the least impact; however, in part due to the “CNN effect,” political will to address the conflict often occurs only once a country has descended into crisis.
d. Conflict Settlement: In this phase efforts are made to mitigate the conflict and seek a lasting resolution. The initiative for the settlement could come from one of a number of sources, internal, regional, or international. The scale of violence has lessened considerably, accompanied by an improvement in socioeconomic and political conditions. Although the settlement phase is depicted here in terms of a smooth decline in the level of violence, the actual path will depend on the speed and success of negotiation. At this stage, humanitarian relief needs are reduced, refugee re-integration can begin, and medium or long-term development projects again become feasible.
e. Post-Conflict Transition and Development Phase: This phase signifies the end of violence, and return to peace. Refugee resettlement is complete and humanitarian relief is no longer necessary in the absence of natural disaster. This stage signifies a time for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and initiating a course towards sustainable development.
E. IMPACT OF CONFLICT
One of the findings to emerge most strongly from participatory poverty research in Uganda is that insecurity and conflict are amongst the most urgent concerns expressed by the poor themselves. Armed conflict is a hugely important factor in the impoverishment of the East and North of Uganda.[6]
The impact of conflict on affected populations is staggering. Even “minor” outbreaks with relatively few direct deaths are accompanied by socio-economic crises, humanitarian emergencies, famines and epidemics, and terrible suffering.
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Direct Human Impact |
Indirect Socio-economic Impact |
Opportunity Costs |
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· Death by violence, famine or disease · Stress and distress · Migration · Environmental destruction |
· Erosion/degradation of social networks –school, clinics, family · Destabilization of economic networks –marketing, crediting · Degradation/destruction of infrastructure – housing, transport, irrigation · Loss of human capital –skills, knowledge |
· Crops not grown · Goods not traded · Skills not learned · Development not improved |
When we think of the impacts of conflict, we
almost always think about its victims, who endure tremendous loss and
suffering. Those most vulnerable – the
poor, women, children, and minorities bear the burden of these affects,
although some still erroneously assume that those most at risk are
combatants. Women and children account
for up to 80% of Africa’s displaced and represent the most vulnerable
populations in times of crisis. Stresses
placed on women are immense and encompass not only war-related physical and
sexual violence, but also increasing levels of domestic abuse, which result
from the breakdown of traditional community and family life and the ensuing
erosion of cultural mechanisms that protect and support women. Their weak status also makes them
particularly vulnerable to shortages of food and medicine; meanwhile, the
burdens on women increase as they shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding
the well-being of children while being forced to cope with the new demands of
daily life in a crisis situation. Meanwhile, the horrific and escalating
phenomenon of child soldiers lays bare how the lines between victims and
victimizers becomes blurred during times of war; the ferocity displayed by
half-grown killers lays bare the intense traumatization of society and the
immense psychological wounding that takes place. As Elizabeth Rubin (1998) comments, “Perhaps one of the most
terrifying sights in the dozens of post-Cold War insurgencies around the world
is that of a thirteen-year-old with a loaded Kalashnikov.”
At the same time, we must also consider the fact that there are some who benefit from war. Indeed, many leaders (e.g. “warlords”) may stand to lose more from peace than continued conflict. During times of chaos, some benefit through economic monopoly guaranteed by military might and total impunity for their actions. These figures have extensive patronage networks which can be relied upon to defend this arrangement. Furthermore, if the only experience communities have with state structures has been coercive, they may react to attempts to re-institute even democratic structures with suspicion and hostility. When devising conflict prevention, mitigation, or recovery strategies, these issues must be fully recognized and these stakeholders considered in strategic planning.
CHAPTER II:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CONFLICT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (CVA)
In conflict studies a clear conceptual distinction must be made between Risk Assessment (RA) and Early Warning (EW). RA is a more long-term to medium term exercise. It attempts to evaluate the potential for violence in a given country or community. It is essentially a probability analysis although it is generally not possible to give a precise quantitative assessment of the risk. The focus is primarily though not exclusively on structural variables (see Figure 1-C).
EW is applied to a more limited number of situations already singled out through RA as high-risk. EW aims at anticipating and tracking escalation in the shorter term from high risk –usually political tension or sporadic violence—to open or high hostility conflict. Early Warning (EW) refers to "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict" (cited by Schmid 1998).
Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) includes RA, but adds to it a studied judgment of the capacity of the country or community to cope with risk factors - to manage tensions, to contain violence, and to rebuild the torn social fabric after violence has been contained. For example, both Malaysia and Sri Lanka are countries with deep ethnic and religious divisions, but Malaysia has successfully been able to cope with this risk factor whereas Sri Lanka has experienced a protracted civil war. They share a similar risk but their vulnerability to that risk has been quite different. It should be noted, however, that both risk and vulnerability can change over time, and in some cases can be transformed quite rapidly.
EW, RA and CVA initiatives should pro-active. They are undertaken in the hope that accurate assessments would lead to policy and program initiatives that would help to minimize or avoid conflict and improve coping capacities. Foreign assistance outside of humanitarian emergency assistance essentially focuses on long-term sustainable development. Thus for a donor, points of intervention to reduce the risk of conflict and increase the coping capacity of conflict must be integrated into long-term development programs. However, diagnosing a problem is only the first step towards formulating an appropriate response. EW, RA and CVA can help inform the strategic planning process, but analyzing vulnerability is a different analytical problem than determining the most effective course of action.
A. Conceptual Issues
CVA approaches are based on some theory of conflict that identify the causal factors or early stages of new, continuing or renewed conflict. This manual draws upon a variety of sources, especially those of the Development Research Group (DECRG) of the World Bank and the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) of The Netherlands, to develop three overlapping frameworks or perspectives for understanding the dynamics of conflict:
· Social Fragmentation
· State Collapse
· Structural Factors
For example, the University of Maryland’s Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project focuses upon social fragmentation, tracking the status of ethnopolitical conflict amongst some 270 politically active communal groups worldwide. The CIA-commissioned State Failure Task Force in McLean, Virginia, has tracked variables associated with state collapse from 1954-1996. Last year DECRG began coordinating a large-scale research program into the structural (particularly economic) factors contributing to conflict.
Broadly there are two categories of EW and CVA models (Davies and Gurr 1998). The first are interpretive models that are generally favored by policy makers who normally have to operate under institutional and time constraints. Interpretive models de-emphasize the use of explicit analytical methods or sources in favor of expert opinion from field officers, and tend to be sensitive to the needs of decision-makers.
The second category is analytical models. They probe more systematically into structural (causal) factors, look for complex patterns in dynamic (event) data, or combine both in sequential models for both long-term risk assessments and short-term early warnings as needed. As with interpretive models, they need to be linked carefully to the needs of decision-makers and potential respondents.
EW and VA models can differ in their focus. Such as “crisis” in general, human rights violations, political instability, refugees, food crises, health emergencies and environment-related conflict to ethno-political wars.
[A review of various CVA/EW Models, Frameworks, and initiatives]
B. A Framework for CVA and Policy Response
This draft framework includes interpretive and analytical components without resorting to complex analytical techniques. The conceptual framework is designed to assist in the process of undertaking a CVAthrough a series of steps to guide through the development of the CVA and identify the possible implications for mission programs and policy. (See the figure on the following page.) This framework integrates the three perspectives on conflict – social fragmentation, state collapse, and structural factors - in the conflict risk assessment in the belief that the three perspectives complement each other, conflict is a very complex phenomenon, and that all three sources of conflict can be - and often are - present.
First identify significant identity (ethnic, political, religious, etc.) groups within the population and map the current level of conflict amongst these groups. Next, Assess indicators of structural conflict as well as social fragmentation and state failure. Using this information, assess conflict risk within the population. Following the risk assessment, there is an instrument to help evaluate the population's coping capacity. These exercises are the two components of the CVA.
The ultimate point of CVA is to inform policy and program choices. Thus, the final steps of the framework assess USAID’s options to respond in order to prevent or mitigate conflict or to support recovery once conflict has been contained.
There are two categories of data used for the analysis. One is “hard” data such as population, GNP, income distribution and so forth that are specific and quantifiable although the mere quantification of data does not necessarily guarantee reliability. The second category of data used is “soft” data that deal with, for example, perceptions and opinions. While there are scales for such items as "level of democracy", this manual extensively uses checklists adapted from PIOOM. Throughout, we have tried to avoid a simplistic number-crunching approach and tried to ensure that we utilize your informed judgment and expertise.
Appendix to Chapter II
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Review of Available Tools for Conflict Vulnerability Analysis By John Davies Given the rapid developments in this field, it is not possible to provide a complete or authoritative listing of early warning related projects. We have identified a number of significant or potentially significant open-access projects, but new projects are constantly created, and existing projects are changed or completed. This review is intended as a point of entry, to be expanded, corrected and updated over time (** and * indicate the more useful sites). |
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I. Monitoring Systems: |
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A. Major Information Centers for Current and Potential Crises |
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**1. ReliefWeb |
Internet-based information management system on current complex emergencies, including broad array of country background profiles, maps, and current situational and analytical information from IOs, NGOs, governments, universities and news sources—open access, aimed to support humanitarian relief operations directly and through raising public awareneness. Internet: www.reliefweb.int. |
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**2. Integrated Regional Information Networks
(IRIN) |
Internet based system to provide information on emergency situations in Africa and Central Asia, including daily updates and weekly roundups, extra reports, maps, and graphics—open access, English and French. Internet: www.reliefweb.int/IRIN |
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**3. Contemporary Conflicts in Africa |
Provides links to wide range of IOs and NGOs providing information on current conflicts, conflict prevention, refugees, arms control, peace initiatives, country profiles, maps, and other conflict related data. Internet: www.synapse.net/~acdi20/ |
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B. Armed Conflicts—Analytical Data |
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*1. PIOOM |
Annual global inventory of all armed conflicts, including issues, actors, civilian and military casualties, refugees, human rights violations—limited access database with annual publication of PIOOM’s World Conflict and Human Rights Map. Also provides “checklists” for monitoring and generating country profiles on tensions, conflict escalation and recovery. Internet: www.fsw.leidenuniv.nl/www/w3_liswo/pioom.htm. |
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*2. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute),
Solna, Sweden and Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, |
Annual global inventory of major armed conflicts, including issues, actors, and military casualties. SIPRI yearbooks also include information on conflict management initiatives and on production and transfer of weapons and military technology, including chemical and biological weapons and overall military expenditure—published/open access database. Internet: www.sipri.se. (See also FIRST.) |
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**3. FIRST (Facts on International Relations
and Security Trends) |
FIRST is a joint project of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), SIPRI and other institutes, providing an integrated on-line database from several research institutes on armed conflicts and peace keeping, arms production and trade, military expenditure, armed forces and weapons holdings; indicators of development, political and economic stability, IDPs, human security, human rights, environment, diversity, political violence and terrorism, along with maps, chronologies and other data helpful for conflict vulnerability analysis. Internet: http://first.sipri.org |
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C. Human Rights Violations |
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*1. Amnesty International |
Field reports/assessments and annual country reports on individual and collective human rights violations—open access. Internet: www.amnesty.org |
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*2. Human Rights Watch |
Periodic country reports and annual world report on individual and collective human rights and humanitarian law violations. Its Arms Project investigates the link between the arms trade and human rights abuses and analyzes weapons systems (e.g., landmines) under humanitarian law. Open access, based on field reports/assessments. Internet: www.hrw.org |
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*3. U.S. State Department |
Annual country reports on overall human rights status—open access, based on field reports/assessments. Internet: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ |
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4. Human Rights Internet |
Internet-based global information-sharing system for NGOs concerned with human rights. Includes reports on current human rights issues or crises. Internet: www.hri.ca |
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5. HURIDOCS |
Irregular reports on specific
human rights violations—open access, based on standard format field
reports. Internet: |
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II. Current Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems |
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A. Public Sector |
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1. Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS), UNOCHA |
Database of background conditions for most countries, with more intensive monitoring of accelerating factors for countries identified as vulnerable to humanitarian crises, drawing quantitative and qualitative information from UN field offices and agencies and other sources. Used to support interpretive analyses and reports for decision makers in UN operational agencies—access limited to relevant UN agencies and member states. Internet: www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/pad/hews.html |
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2. Conflict Prevention Center, OSCE (Org. for Security and
Cooperation in Europe), Vienna. |
The CPC provides support for OSCE negotiating and decision-making bodies in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. Its Operations Centre identifies potential crisis areas and plans for future missions and operations. Primary focus on the former USSR and Yugoslavia. Access limited to internal agencies and member states. On-line reports on prevention initiatives available. Internet: www.osce.org |
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*3. Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) |
Current vulnerability assessments of potential food emergencies for 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, based on in-country reports by networked field representatives taking into account harvest, internal factors (economic, social, demographic, health, environment), external hazards (conflict, natural disasters, price shifts etc.) and coping capacity. Used as basis for crisis prevention planning and related development work strengthening host country capacity. Regular country, regional and topical reports available on-line, along with data on prices, natural disasters, weather imaging etc. Internet: www.fews.net |
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4. Global Information Early Warning System (GIEWS) |
Global monitoring of food demand and supply for all basic foods, and early warning alerts of imminent food crises, drawing information from governments, news sources, NGOs and in-country assessments by FAO field representatives. Open access—monthly, bimonthly, quarterly and ad hoc reports. Internet: www.fao.org/giews |
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5. Genoa Project, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) |
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6. State Failure Project |
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B. Private Sector—Model-Based Analyses |
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**1. Minorities at Risk Project, CIDCM |
Model-based risk assessments of potential ethnopolitical conflicts, supported by profiles of 275 minority groups considered politically significant (based on relative size and risk levels). Assessments accessible in “Peace and Conflict 2001” report on-line. Five-year risk assessments show 70% success rate in predicting outbreak of ethnic war. Open access: profiles, chronologies (1990–2000, updated periodically), manual and very detailed indicator data (zipped) available via internet: www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm |
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**2. Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
(FEWER) |
A global network of NGOs, research institutions, UN/IO agencies and governments for information exchange and partnership for early warning and prevention of violent conflicts. Regionally based networks are operational in the Caucasus, Central Asia, South East Asia, African Great Lakes and West African regions, with a new network being planned for Latin America. Regular early warning reports, including future scenarios and recommendations for preventive action, accessible via Internet: www.fewer.org |
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3. FUGI Global Early Warning System |
Model-based risk assessments of potential refugee flows or forced migrations from/in 200 countries/territories based on environment, economic development, security, and human rights indicators. Open access, irregular publication (beginning with Asian countries), available via internet: http://suissgate.t.soka.ac.jp |
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**4. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Canada |
Provides model-based risk assessments and country rankings, along with data on indicators of human security, terrorism, human rights, diversity, environment and other variables. Several of these are also included in the FIRST project at SIPRI (above). Internet: www.carleton.ca/cifp
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5. The Fund For Peace |
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**6. FAST
Project, |
SPF’s conflict early warning system (FAST) incorporates model-based risk assessments in combination with indicator measurement, events monitoring and qualitative analysis from field reports and a network of local experts. Annual country risk profiles on African and Central and South Asian cases. Internet: www.swisspeace.ch |
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**7. Network of Ethnological |
Network of leading experts in CIS countries on ethnic conflict, monitoring CIS ethnopolitics, generating conflict early warnings to facilitate early response particularly in Caucasus and Central Asia. Combination of local expert- and model-based early warnings, including future scenarios and recommendations for preventive action. Publishes reports in English via FEWER. Internet access in Russian via www.eawarn.ras.ru; and see www.fewer.org for English language reports. |
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C. Private Sector—Interpretive Analyses |
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1. Center for Preventive Action, Council on |
Sends expert teams to make in-country interpretive analyses based on interviewing as basis for conflict early warnings, and advocates appropriate early preventive actions. Limited to African Great Lakes, Nigeria, Central Asia (Ferghana Valley) and Balkans. Preventive Action Reports and regional case studies published and on Internet: www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?prog!97 |
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**2. International Crisis Group |
ICG’s CrisisWeb reports and briefings provide expert analyses and ideas to head off impending crises, drawing on in-country field assessments, and networking with governments to promote preventive action. Internet: www.intl-crisis-group.org |
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**3. ACCNET |
ACCORD (African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes) is developing ACCNET, an early warning system for Africa utilizing primary and secondary data sources from the region to increase awareness of current and potential conflict situations. The monthly Conflict Trends magazine provides overviews of current conflicts and conflict management/development initiatives. Internet: www.accord.org.za |
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4. Refugees International |
In-country emergency assessments of refugee flows for selected countries, used for refugee advocacy and support globally. Early warning bulletins available via Internet: www.refintl.org |
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5. Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), ETH Zurich |
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III. Early Warning Networks |
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**1. Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
(FEWER) |
A global network of NGOs, research institutions, UN/IO agencies and governments for information exchange and partnership for early warning and prevention of violent conflicts. Regionally based networks are operational in the Caucasus, Central Asia, South East Asia, African Great Lakes and West African regions, with a new network being planned for Latin America. Regular early warning reports, including future scenarios and recommendations for preventive action, accessible via Internet: www.fewer.org |
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2. Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) |
The CPN is a network of academic institutions, NGOs and independent experts, and it forms part of the European Union Analysis and Evaluation Centre (EUAEC), managed by SWP in Ebenhausen for the European Commission. It aims to provide analytical and operational input to the EU system to facilitate preventive action. Limited Internet access via www.swp-berlin.org/cpn/ |
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3. European Platform for Conflict Prevention
and Transformation The Netherlands
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Facilitates networking, education, information exchange, and advocacy on conflict prevention drawing on European NGOs. Publications include: “The Conflict Prevention Newspaper,” monitoring global advances in conflict prevention; “People Building Peace” with case studies of conflict management and peace building; “Women Building Peace” and “Searching for Peace in Africa” (1999 overview of conflict prevention and management activities). Internet: www.euconflict.org. |
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4. Conflict Watch-Africa |
Joint initiative to share information on potential and actual conflicts among organizations working in Africa to aid conflict prevention and peace building. Briefings, news reports and related papers on current conflicts in Africa available on-line. Internet access via www.ips.org (under “critical issues”) |
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5. Ethnobarometer Project |
A network of European institutes and researchers, monitoring interethnic relations in Europe. Provides a link between researchers and policy makers at various levels. Produces an annual report on the state of interethnic relations in Europe. Internet: www.ethnobarometer.org |
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