Symposium on "Preventing and Coping with HlV/AlDS in Post-Conflict Societies: Gender Based Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa"

 Prepared by

 Nsama Chikwanke

SOCIETY FOR WOMEN AND AIDS IN ZAMBIA (SWAAZ)

 A NARRATIVE ON "COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO REFUGEE CRISIS; A BETTER WAY TO COPE"

 BACKGROUND

The Society for women and AIDS in Zambia (SWAAZ) has, for the past 10 years, been reaching out to grassroots communities to sensitize, educate and conscietize them on HlV/AlDS and other related issues. Central to its programs are the women (including the girl‑child) and Youth, perceived to be vulnerable, who have been empowered with knowledge on their rights, sexual and reproductive health, and encouraging income generating activities as well as training in various skills including psycho‑social and counseling to enable them be very responsive and be able to sustain themselves.  With community ownership of its programs and therefore volunteer driven, the organization has a strong presence in eight of the nine regions and is actively spread out in North­ Western, Western Luapula and Northern regions where communities are directly grappling with the refugee crisis.

'The arrival of asylum seekers on these hosting communities inadvertently leads to the disruption of social systems as they brace themselves to make necessary adjustments to accommodate these refugees. In an effort to adapt, these communities undergo, in varying, degrees a loosening of the moral fabric, reduced economic opportunities, and a reduction in the availability of resources and other opportunities. This situation is potentially explosive in that the costs may perceive refugees as 'competitor.‑;' and may adopt an aggressive attitude displayed in unfriendly gestures and behaviors. This would consequently, make the refugees even more terrified and insecure as their perceived and hoped for peace in a land of refuge becomes far‑fetched, It is with this background that SWAAZ decided to put in place some interventions by initiating a project loosely named "Community Responses to Refugee crisis; a better way to cope".

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this project was to raise community awareness on the influx of refugees and their plight. It was hoped it would stimulate positive responses and strengthen the capacity of women and youths in these communities to take a more pro‑active role in advocating for and adopting community building, and peace‑enhancing behaviours. Through skills training, the communities were to be empowered to effectively participate in the development, implementation and evaluation of programmes.

Objectives

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The Project comprised a team of three field staff and driver all reporting to the Project Coordinator at the National Secretariat, Except for on the spot administrative matters, administrative and other logistical support were done at the Secretariat. Tremendous field support was received from our branches in the respective communities. The project was implemented in two phases.

Phase I

This included a needs assessment followed by a questionnaire. The aim was to establish die knowledge, attitude and practices of hosting communities towards the refugee crisis in Zambia. Targeted regions included, but not restricted to, those receiving and/or hosting these displaced people particularly Northwestern, Western, Luapula and Northern regions. The identified entry points were mainly the traditional rulers education authorities Political leaders as well as religious structures. The implementing agencies were the local SWAAZ branches while the Secretariat helped in monitoring and evaluation. This phase was expected to last three to six months.

Data analysis from the questionnaires revealed the following Key points:

1. Conflicts are caused by political and civic leaders who should bear responsibility instead of 'burdening' Zambia
2. Refugees are more of a liability than assets as some of them are involved in crime activities as they strive to, for example, look for food
3. It is okay to offer sanctuary to those seeking it but this should be temporary
4. Government is spending too much money on this refugee business instead of developing local infrastructure
5. Respondents agreed that indeed chances of HIV transmission within the community are raised as some refugees’ status could not easily be determined though they still indulge in sex" activities
6. The refugees start flocking in well before conflicts heighten in the pretext of cross border traders.

These responses strengthened our resolve even further as we felt the urgent need to move in and clear some misconceptions. It was believed that anything done beyond this point would greatly help change the attitudes and behaviours of our respondents.

Phase II

In executing this stage guidance was drawn from the responses from the questionnaire, which also helped us develop our message. This message was to be transmitted through drama (public performances) and workshops/seminars as well as through poems, songs etc. The use (if the local language was encouraged, The aim was to sensitize and raise community awareness on the usefulness of refugees as my organization believes in the resourcefulness of every human individual, whether displaced or in their optimum social set ups. The above activities were to address the following concerns, among others,

‑ Who is my neighbour;

‑ Refugee crisis: causes and content;

‑ Social responsibility and community living;

‑ HlV/AlDS in refugee communities; how can we cope

Unfortunately before moving into workshops in the pilot region (North-western), the project was stalled as the resources allocated for this segment got swallowed up and was only to resume after resources were sourced. In other areas, even the sensitization would not lake off.

The resources so far ploughed into the project were drawn from some of our fundraising activities such as sell of second hand clothes donated by JICA (some were distributed to out orphans project and others were contributed to refugees at Makeni, Lusaka) and also from sell of the remainders of mealie meal distributed to our women and micro credit project and donated by HELP Zambia. In short, the project was kicked off without specific external funding such as that when our limited resources were sucked up, this particular project had reached a 'natural' dead end. The expansiveness of the project (which increased running costs) and the poor performance of local economy greatly contributed to the short-circuiting of the project.

Despite the project being short‑lived before it could be adapted to other vulnerable regions, the project staff and team were encouraged that it took off and particularly that communities overwhelmingly responded to most of the public performances, attributable to the active involvement of the local leaders and synergism of all local efforts.

Among the unexpected outcomes was the shortfall in resources, it also became difficult to access certain areas while at some public performances (about two), the audience comprised mostly young ones as their elders were reportedly out in the field collecting food and or preparing the land for the farming season. At the stage the project stalled, it was very difficult to conclusively assess the impact though indicators suggested it would be one great project if only it was given the opportunity to reach maturity.

INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

From the outset, the following were expected to point to the success of this project.

In the short time that the project existed major obstacles were mainly operational constraints in the form of such equipment as computers and communication facilities to link the field office with the main office. This often led to a delayed response to certain urgent calls. Though the district Agricultural authorities came to our aid from time to time, there was a need for heavy‑duty vehicles, the type that would work in sandy as well as hill), areas. Communities often times associate NGOs with monetary handouts and this had to be clarified which expectedly caused a slight drop in active participants including the frequency of attendance by some.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Over zealousness at the birth of project by both planning and implementing wings leads to overlooking certain key operational and administrative prerequisites

2. Socio-cultural factors kneaded with 910 economic main stay of the recipient communities contributes to die success and should therefore be borne in mind.

3. Always bear in mind that the society of refugees comprises of cross‑section of individuals with different perceptions and expectations as well as responses to any interventions. This blend of characters would work either for or against the success of any proposed Initiatives.

4. Some form of motivating implementing agencies at the grassroots should be worked out even though they may be volunteers, as in our case. This encourages them to stay even longer and contribute more positively.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND POLICY MAKERS

1. Most conflicts in Africa are caused by manipulative practices of out leaders most of whom would do anything just to cling on to power; this must be stopped, as one cannot cheat all the people Al the time.

2. It is amazing to note the association between poverty and conflict as seen in most countries embroiled in wars in Sub‑Saharan Africa are striving towards economic empowerment of its people. While debt servicing is; important, it is just as important for governments and policy makers to work towards offering better living conditions otherwise the widening gap between leaders and the led, rich and poor, both of which are recipes for conflict, would reach alarming proportions.

3. New governments should avoid a complete or total change of policies but should rather modify or build on those left by predecessors A shift in policies entails a shift in the way of life of the community or society and this shift may take any form depending on the predisposing factors.

4. In countries like Zambia where refugees are surrounded by other villagers, the UNHCR should avoid, if practicable, practices that make indigenous communities perceive refugees as the 'well to do' minority, a perception which may fuel thievery and sometimes conformations in demand for some of the privileges.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

1. Donors should not concentrate only on financial support but work towards technical support and capacity building;

2. Building and strengthening institutional capacity means their support can be made more sustainable and therefore enables if to have a multiplier effect.