Session III A. 

Nicole Ball comments on demobilization and reintegration in Angola.

Background:

The information on Angola provided in this session was derived primarily from a lessons learned study that I co-authored for OCHA in 1997. That study examined the effectiveness of OCHA’s field office in Angola – known by its Portuguese acronym UCAH – in coordinating a range of humanitarian assistance. Because the UN Demobilization and Reintegration Office (DRO) was located within UCAH, that study included a section on demobilization activities. The fact that the DRO was located within UCAH meant that it was physically separated from the peacekeeping mission, UNAVEM III. This created not-inconsiderable friction between UCAH and UNAVEM headquarters. The decision to house the DRO in UCAH was made primarily to maximize the financial contribution of bilateral donors and to facilitate the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the demobilization process, particularly the cantonment phase of the demobilization process. Both donors and NGOs tended to see UNAVEM III as a military operation, despite that fact that it was led by a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and many of its activities were non-military in nature. In early 1997, when the field work for this report was conducted: No adults had been demobilized but some had been cantonned for as much as15 months. The demobilization of minors was getting under way. Planning for reintegration was at a fairly early stage. Therefore, we essentially observed a cantonment process. The full report on UCAH’s coordination activities is available on the internet at: http://www.reliefweb.int

Lessons from Angola:

The four lessons discussed below are not new. Angola simply reinforces the importance of going beyond simply observing these lessons and incorporating them into policy and operational work. Political will: The first lesson has to do with political will. It has already been pointed out that political will is often weak in countries making the transition from war to peace. However, there are degrees of weakness, and in Angola, political will was essentially non-existent. UNAVEM III was an exercise in trying to create political will among the parties to the conflict. As such, it clearly did not succeed. It is possible for external actors to foster political will during peace processes. One question that needs to be answered is whether it is always impossible under all circumstances, to create political will. I am unable to answer that question. The lesson I draw from Angola, however, is that as long as the peacekeeping operation is not operating under Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter and is not willing to use force to protect the peace agreement, it is impossible to create political will. Non-military roles of peacekeeping troops A second lesson is that the contribution of peacekeeping troops to the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has to go beyond disarming combatants as they enter cantonment areas and providing security for soldiers in cantonment areas awaiting discharge. Some of the tasks that UNAVEM III troops could have undertaken but most frequently did not include: Ensure that every soldier entering the cantonment areas turn in a weapon, preferably a functioning weapon. Angola had one of the lowest rates of weapon turn in of any demobilization process up to that point. Approximately one-third of the cantoned soldiers handed in a functioning weapon; another third handed in a non-functioning weapon; the last third handed in no weapon at all. Search for arms caches. In his presentation, Graham Day suggested that the failure to disarm all combatants was not a cause for worry. In Mozambique and El Salvador that was correct. In Angola, I believe that showing the UN was serious about weapon collection would have had a positive influence on the creation of political will. Provide security for the family encampments located near cantonment areas. UNAVEM troops frequently refused to demine family areas or otherwise provide security. Address the special problems of child soldiers. In Angola, there was an extensive program to identify child soldiers, trace their families, and secure their early release from cantonment. Angola was notable in fact for the willingness of UNITA to admit that it had child soldiers in its ranks and to allow them to be registered. Government forces were slower to reveal the number of child soldiers, but the government did pass legislation exempting former child soldiers from subsequent service in the armed forces. Nonetheless, when child soldiers were released in UNITA areas, they were sometimes kidnapped from unarmed IOM transports by UNITA troops. UNAVEM III commanders initially said that they could not provide protection for these transports. The SRSG then consulted with the UNAVEM military commanders and announced that escorts would be provided “to the extent possible.” The military commanders then said it would not “be possible” under most circumstances. Characteristics of the agency overseeing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. The experience of DDR in Angola suggests that the institution which assumes responsibility in any given situation for program design and coordination should possess the following characteristics: 1) civilian orientation, 2) an institutional ethos of collaboration, 3) flexibility, 4) sensitivity to the needs of beneficiaries and an ability to work with beneficiaries and 5) familiarity with local conditions. Civilian orientation. It is sometimes argued that demobilization is a politico-military activity and as such is most appropriately overseen by the peacekeeping mission. Reintegration is always seen as an entirely civilian-humanitarian-developmental affair. In fact, demobilization is a key aspect of reducing militarization in societies that have experienced civil war. It is the first step soldiers take on the path toward civilian society. Seen in this context, it is extremely important that the civilian character of the demobilization process be emphasized and that the institution responsible for planning and coordinating demobilization is recognizably civilian in nature and sensitive to the humanitarian and developmental aspects of the process. Institutional ethos of collaboration. UCAH’s success in coordinating humanitarian assistance in Angola, including demobilization and reintegration planning and activities in the UNITA cantonment areas, was directly linked to the willingness of UCAH staff to act in a truly collaborative manner. While a collaborative ethos cannot overcome all problems – and did not in the case of UCAH – coordination is next to impossible in its absence. The choice of staff at all levels is an important factor in determining how successfully an institution develops and retains an ethos of collaboration. Responsibility for demobilization and reintegration should be vested in a body that has the ability to attract staff with the capacity to foster collaboration among a diverse group of actors. OCHA, and its predecessor the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, has had a mixed record in this regard. UCAH’s success in Angola, particularly during 1993 and 1994 after the resumption of conflict and prior to the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, contrasts with the widely held perception that UNOHAC – its counterpart in Mozambique during that country’s peace process. UNOHAC was charged with developing reinsertion and reintegration programs for ex-combatants in Mozambique and was taken to task for inadequate consultation and an overly directive style. Flexibility. Large bureaucracies tend to be less nimble and capable of changing direction rapidly than smaller organizations. However, several of the UN entities such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP which frequently operate in emergency environments have streamlined their operating procedures and are better able to respond rapidly to evolving situations. Thus size is not, in and of itself, an argument against locating the responsibility for demobilization programs in large agencies. Rather, the ability of an organization to adapt to complex and often chaotic environments is critical. Sensitivity to the needs of beneficiaries and ability to work with beneficiaries. As with development programs, ownership is extremely important in the area of demobilization and reintegration. The parties to the conflict submit to demobilization only reluctantly, especially the armed opposition which loses its leverage once it disarms and disbands its military force. In consequence, it is extremely important that the parties fully accept cantonment arrangements and that the benefits for troops undergoing cantonment are sufficient to keep them in place but not so substantial that they are loathe to leave cantonment areas. It is also important that the reinsertion package and longer-term reintegration opportunities provided are sufficiently attractive to give a sense of hope that they can re-establish themselves in civilian life. In order for this to occur, the planning agency must be able to work closely with representatives of the armed forces and the armed opposition in a collaborative fashion. Familiarity with local conditions. Just as sensitivity to the needs of beneficiaries will enhance the quality of demobilization and reintegration programming, familiarity with the country in question derived from a local presence prior to the signing of a peace accord will enhance an organization’s ability to oversee the demobilization and reintegration process. UCAH/DRO clearly benefited from being located within an operation that had been in Angola during wartime and which had developed positive relationships with key leaders on both sides of the conflict. Whether or not it is possible to locate the local planning and implementation unit within an entity that has been on the ground for some period of time, it is crucial to include on its staff as many individuals with knowledge of the country as possible. It is particularly important for staff to understand the nature of the conflict and its likely impact on their activities. Thus, the entity chosen must have the capacity to identify such individuals. Quality of staffAs already indicated above, the quality of staff is important to the success of DDR efforts. Capable staff is required both within the body or bodies overseeing DDR planning and implementation and within the implementing agencies themselves. Critical qualities include: previous experience in crisis environments, knowledge of the country/region affected, ability to speak a local language, flexibility, a collaborative work style, ability to think outside the box, and a beneficiary-orientation. For the most part, UCAH staff possessed these characteristics, although this was not uniformly the case and UCAH’s work did suffer in those cases where, for example, UCAH staff were failed to collaborate either with other UCAH staff or with other parts of the peacekeeping mission. There were also some problems with regard to the involvement of NGOs in the cantonment process. NGOs played a central role in the delivery of services in UNITA cantonment areas. In conjunction with UNITA personnel, they oversaw the distribution of food, provided health care, and ran the civic education programs for assembled UNITA troops. In deciding to involve NGOs in the day-to-day operations of the cantonment areas, UCAH was drawing on precedents from demobilization experiences in Mozambique and El Salvador. UCAH’s decision to accord NGOs a significant role in the UNITA cantonment areas was grounded first and foremost in the belief that this would help the ex-combatants adjust to civilian life. There were, however, addition benefits. The use of NGOs decreased the UN’s role in hiring staff and in direct operations, and somewhat reduced UCAH’s funding burden since the NGOs were, in principle, responsible for raising money from the donor community for their activities in the cantonment areas. The significance of shifting the responsibility fop filling some 75 international staff positions from the UN system, with its excruciatingly slow and cumbersome recruitment practices, to NGOs should not be underrated. The use of NGOs to deliver services in the cantonment areas was not, however, problem-free. Most of the experienced international NGOs declined to participate in quartering area programs. None of the Médecins Sans Frontières branches, for example, chose to take part, despite the fact that various MSF branches had been active in similar situations in Mozambique and El Salvador. This meant that many of the NGOs had little or no corporate experience in war-affected countries, let alone in Angola, and were generally inexperienced in the programs they were contracted to implement. UCAH actually sought to attract NGOs by arguing that work in the cantonment areas would provide them with the basis on which to subsequently develop other, more developmentally oriented activities. Selecting NGOs with no experience in food storage, management and distribution contributed to losses and mismanagement of World Food Programme food in the cantonment areas. An additional complication was that UCAH staff in the cantonment areas usually did not have the expertise necessary to train or advice NGO staff on such matters. To address NGO experience on health-related issues, WHO seconded a public health officer to work with UCAH and support the NGOs in the cantonment areas. UCAH discovered that the less-experienced and smaller NGOs required considerably more support than the few more established NGOs such as Africare or Catholic Relief Services that did work in the cantonment areas. Institutional support mechanisms capable of providing minimal living conditions for their staff or fund-raising, for instance, are critically important to the ability of an organization to work in a war-affected region. The smaller NGOs lacked this infrastructure. One NGO had to leave a cantonment area for a few months when a gap in funding arose. Individually, many of the staff of these smaller NGOs were highly dedicated and worked hard under extremely difficult conditions to make the cantonment process a success. However, their inexperience and the inability of their organizations to provide them with the necessary resources, including training, underscores the difficulties that can be created by using relatively inexperienced organizations to carry out complex programs in difficult environments.